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IlftRODucrrON' 
AbOut a year bas passed since the resignation of one 
of' the most Imposing political flguresot the Twentieth Cen­
tury--Cbarles de Gaulle. Twice--duringWorld War II and 
again during the late 19SOs--he oame to "deliver" hls 
.oountrl' trom the crises of defeat In war and rebell1Gn 1n 
Algeria. Rls 1mpact on Prance and indeed on the world during 
a period spanning nea1"17 three decades has been undeniably 
considerable. De Gaulle not only has been a wartime military 
leader. but was an important military theoretician as well. 
whose views on modern armored warfare were ignored prior to 
World War II by fellow officers only to the detriment of 
France. While apparently 11ttle of a sentimentalist in most 
areas. he used the most emotional words and phrases where 
bis oountry was concerned. Indeed. his command of the 
French language was superior, and his War memoirs. some 
believe. will live as among the finest examples of Twentieth 
Century French writing. His concern was with France. but de 
Gaulle's international policies during his tenure as French 
president evoked storms of rage throughout many parts of the 
western world, particularly for his alleged efforts toward 
further Western European integration. 
This paper is written in an effort to assess that 
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latter top1e. the role ot General de Gaulle relative to 
post-World War II efforts at "unifying" Europe, The ques­
tion of de Gaulle's role 1s an 1mportant one. for although 
European unity has not progressed as far as some proponents 
of unity have desired. the development of various Western 
European multi-national Institutions has been one of the 
outstanding pQlitloal events of the last quarter-oentury. 
If de Gaulle did indeed block efforts toward further 
European un1ty, then many questions present themselves, Why 
did he do so? Did his personal efforts mean that much. or 
were obstaoles to European unity set up more by the condi­
tion of France as a state rather than by de Gaulle as an 
individual? If' there is or should be a blame east far put­
ting up obstacles to further integration, it is fair to 
point so directly at de Gaulle and France? What has been 
the attitude of the other five members of' the present Euro­
pean Community that has been developed? And what has been 
the attltudeof' states outside of this community, especially 
the United States and Great Britain? Finally, if European 
integration indeed has been blooked, can the integrative 
process be stepped up again in the absenoe of de Gaulle? Or 
have chanoes for unification been missed which are irre­
trievable? 
These questions will be pursued in the course of this 
paper, but one initial opinion can be advanoed: De Gaulle 
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did indeed block the vision of European unity that some had 
advanced; but some of his actions, as blunt as they were, 
saved what had been construoted and allowed the possibility 
of growth in the future. De Gaulle indeed was the force 
that kept Britain out ot the European Economio Community in 
1963 and thereafter, but his 1963 action undoubtedly has 
helped the E.E.C. achieve what strength it has today because 
British entry at that time probably would have served to 
weaken the oommunity. Essentially, the thesis of this paper 
is that Charles de Gaulle acted as a supreme Frenoh nation­
alist in his actions and attitudes toward the European uni­
fication movement. While holding stiff attitudes against 
suoh things as "supranational" institutions and loss of 
sovereignty t he, however. has forced other Western European 
states to carefully consider 3ust wbat' it W'"as they were 
building and how they could make it last. In that sense-­
while not perhaps a builder of European un1ficatlon--de 
Gaulle was not the wreoker that some would have him be. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
The problem of assessing the role of General de 
Gaulle in the European unity movement is made more diffioult 
because the unification question crosses so many lines. 
Unity implies different things to different peop1e, as will 
be shown later. and the problem thus beoomes involved 1n 
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politioal and military oons1derations of oooperat1on as well 
as economio integrat10n, the area where the most has been 
aocomplished so far. 
In other words, European unity must be viewed in the 
light of many events and trends of the Post-world. War II 
era. Among the topics and institutions that beoome enmeshed 
1n any discussion of the integration movement are the cold 
war; the eoonomio, military and political ties of the United 
States to Western Europe; the North Atlantic Treaty Organi­
zation (NATO); the division of Germany, and nuclear weapons. 
Another difficulty in assessing the role of de Gaulle 
and France in the European movement relates not only to the 
past "grandeur" of Franoe--whioh indeed has been a factor in 
the entire problem--but the differing oonditions of the 
states that the unity-minded would have integrate. For 
example, France 1s one of the largest Western European 
states and was among the Victorious allies of the Seoond 
World War. But her partners in the E11ropean Economic Com­
munity, or Common Market, although sharing European status, 
are, of oourse, different from France. The Benelux ooun­
tries of the E.E.C••-Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg-­
are small states that may be close to the model when states­
men and. political scientists talk of the "anachronistic" 
nation-state; Germany and Italy were defeated in World War 
II; further, Germany remains diVided, and Ital.y doesn't have 
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the industrial potential of either France or Germany. 
The main outsider--which ln the past few years has 
been looking in--is Great Britain. which isn't on the conti­
nent of Europe, whioh has had close ties wlth its Common­
wealth, whloh refused to join in early efforts to set up 
European multl-state institutions. 
Against these factors then comes the figure of de 
Gaulle. Whose style of politios has been Viewed by some as 
enigmatic, contusing and changeable. Simply stated, assess­
ment of the problem raises difficult questions. 
II. SOURCES, METHOD AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Sources. Main primary sources were the words of 
General de Gaulle himself, espeoially in his World War II 
memoirs and in his speeohes, messages and press oonference 
statements While Frenoh president. The importance of de 
Gaulle's words themselves are two-fold: First, it 113 this 
writer's oontention that de Gaulle was olear in what he 
said; he did not intend to confuse or to be obscure. A 
ohange in taotics might indicate to some a previous inten­
tion to confuse, but it is this writer's contention rather 
that where de Gaulle did ohange his position, it was for 
what he saw as a practical reason rather than an intention 
to obfuscate.. Seoond, de Gaulle used the forum of the press 
oonference to in effeot act, to carry out governmental deci­
6 
-

olslona. Notable ls hls January, 1963 press conference ln 
which he "vetoed" British admission into the Com:mon Market. 
De Gaulle also outlined his major policy premises in these 
press conferences and other messages. Additionally, the 
memoirs are valuable in aoquiring an insight into the baok­
ground of de Gaulle. his attitudes toward building Europe 
and the World War II squabbles he had with his British and 
American allies Which undoubtedly have had some effect in 
his attitudes toward those states insofar as European inte­
gration has been concerned. 
other primary sources oonsulted again oonsisted of 
the words of statesmen of other European states, specifioally 
Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt of west Germany and several 
of the ourrent politioal leaders of Great Britain. These 
have been acquired from several books, periodicals and the 
offic1al publication of the European Communities, the latter 
a valuable source for the 1968-69 period especially. The 
events of 1969--de Gaulle's resignation, the election of 
George l'ompidou as French president. the so-ealled Soames 
affaIr--were studied largely through the pages of the .!!.!! 
York .-T.-I..m....e -.s. 
Among major secondary souroes valuable in the study 
were works relating to the history of the European unity 
movement. over-all views of the Common Market. and studies 
dealing with Frenoh foreIgn polioy under de Gaulle and blo­
7
 
graphical works on de Gaulle. Several oolleotions of 
artioles and essays on the general topic of regionalism or 
integration were consulted as well as numerous periodical 
articles relevant to the topIc. 
Method. The method of study was undertaken with a 
view toward both analyzing new steps taken toward regional 
government in Western Europe and the particular role of one 
man, in one country, and his role in influencing the move­
ment. 
Initially necessary was a determination of the degree 
of regional co-operation and the extent of unIfication mea­
sures taken and the extent to which such steps differed from 
earlier forms of international co-operation. Some consider 
the steps taken toward integration and unification in 
Western Europe as highly significant and. pOinting toward. an 
entirely new form of political assooiation--going beyond 
earlier customs unions, military-type alliances or regional 
politicallY oriented associations. 
Thus an initial step in this study was to delve into 
the historical aspects of the European unity movement to 
acqUire an overview of the nature of integrati on, past con­
oepts of European unity and the steps taken thus far. The 
main intent of this study, however, was not to give a 
detailed analysis of all aspects of the Western European 
unification movement, but rather to determine the influence 
8
 
of one man, Charles de Gaulle. Thus, the basic emphasis 1n 
the study was put into determining to what extent de 
Gaulle's actions and style influenced the overall topic. 
The point that had to be kept 1n mind during the study was 
that indeed General de Gaulle was a major figure 1n whatever 
it was that was happening in European unification over a 
period of years. But it also had to be remembered that what 
de Gaulle was doing needed to be analyzed as to content as 
well as to style and with a view toward determining the 
effect in longer--as well as short-term affects. Some early 
analyses of oertain de Gaulle actions seem to have been 
short-sighted, based too much on how he said things rather 
than on what he said. 
Thus after acquiring this overview of integration in 
Western Europe, the next step was to turn to the actions of 
de Gaulle. Basic emphasis was put into studying his offi­
cial statements, messages and press conference remarks, as 
well as his war-time memoirs. And after that, it was neces­
sary to compare what de Gaulle said With what has taken 
place in the area of European unification. Aocounts of 
actiVities in the area of European integration, various 
interpretations of de Gaulle policy and integration were 
consulted as well as continuing statements about where uni­
fication stood. and where it should be going. This method­
ology then was used to obtain a conclusion about the de 
9 
Gaulle role in the unifioation movement and the direotion in 
whioh the movement may go with his departure from govern­
ment. 
Essentially then, the method involved a oolleotion of 
data, refleotion on the data and an attempt to resolve 
apparent oontradictions, and a final judgement based on the 
series of oonolusions determined. 
Organization .2! ~ study. In presenting this study, 
after an overview of the problem, it was deoided that 
initially it was neoessary to review past oonoepts of what a 
united Europe could or should be, since it is important to 
understand that a united Europe means different things in 
the eyes of different people. It also was felt necessary to 
give some extensive disoussion on what meaning the words 
Jlintegra.tionU and "supra-nationality" have. 
It was deoided then to proceed in a somewhat ohrono­
logical fashion to trace the background of de Ga.ulle includ­
ing his a.scendanoy to power in World War II and his period 
of service as premier and president in 1958-69. Since early 
1963 seems to be a watershed point in the history of Euro­
pean integration--with the Franoo-German treaty of co-opera­
tion and the de Gaulle "veto" of British Common l'farket mem­
bership coming at that time--it was deoided to separate the 
chronology roughly into what transpired before and after 
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that date. 
A next section delves into various views on de Gaulle 
held by statesmen and social scientists and a view of the 
question of nationalism--as praoticed by de Gaulle, as 
interpreted by French political parties, as practiced in 
other parts of Europe. Also discussed here are some of the 
"­de Gaulle policies employed vis-a-vis other states as well 
as the true challenge American industry presents to European 
integrationists and nationalists alike. A look also is 
taken at the possible future steps in European integration 
in the absence of de Gaulle. 
Finally, in the su.m:mary and conclusions, a general 
assessment of de Gaulle and the integration question is 
given. 
III. CONCEPTS OF A UNITED EUROPE 
Ideas of Western European unity can be traced back 
for centuries; and although it may not be relevant to go as 
far as one might, to Dante or even beyond, it is oorrect to 
say that the issue always has been eomplex. But the essen­
tial reasons have remained about a half-dozen: The preserva­
tion of peace, the need for a common defense, the ambition 
to act as a stronger power bloc, the conservation of a com­
mon European oulture, the wish to create greater material 
11 
well-being, the freeing of restrictions on trade. l 
So, while concepts of a united Europe have roots far 
back into history, essentially what has come to pass as true 
steps toward some kind of unity have been taken after World 
War II. The countries of Europe, battered after a devastat­
ing war, recognizing their military and economic weakness, 
were more open to suggestions of unifieation than they per­
haps ever had been before. One post-war spark eame from 
Winston Churchill, on September 19, 1946, while then leader 
of the Opposition in Britain. In a speech at the University 
of Zurich, he proposed making Europe as free and happy as 
Switzerland by recreating "a kind of United States of 
Europe."2 And during the next year, in December, 1947, a 
number of organ1za.ti ons came together to set up a Congress 
of Europe Which met at the Hague in May, 1948. The congress 
had 71) delegates from 16 countries and agreed on institut­
ing an assembly of representatives of European parliaments, 
a. European charter of human rights, a European court, an 
economic union, and the inclusion of Germany 1nto a European 
community.) Then in 1950 came the plan for a oommon market 
in coal and steel proposed by Robert Schuman, the Frenoh 
foreign minister. It proved to be a highly significant sug­
1Michael curtis, western European Integration (New 
York: Harper & Row, 196!) , p. 4. 
2
~ 
Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
I ....
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gestlon and. has led to the development of muoh that has fol­
lowed in Western European integra.tion. More must be men­
tioned of the ooal a.nd steel oommunity later, but there is a 
further need here to attempt to define--or at least give 
some of the varying ideas on--what a united Europe should 
be. As Ernst B. Haas has said, "United Europe" is a phrase 
meahing many things to many men. To some, it implies the 
creating of a full-fledged federation of the states of 
Western Europe, either the "SiX" of the present E.E.C., or 
the many more members of the Council of Europe. To others, 
the phrase means no more than the desirability of creating a 
loose oonoert or oonfederation. Some see in it the death of 
1
oherished patterns of national uniqueness. 
While many European politiolans--and. oertainly 
Charles de Gaulle--have looked upon some sort of merger of 
European nations from a praotical analysis of political, 
eoonom1c and military faotors, it seems true that European­
....
 
ism in the post-war years beoame an "idee-forcel! which 
appealed to sentiment as well as to reason. The idea 
appealed to the desire of belonging to a powerful politiesl 
entity and to the wish to bury old confliots as well as to 
~rnst B. Haas, The Uniting of Euro~e (Sta.nford,
 
california: Stanford Un!vers1ty~ess, 19~5), p. xi.
 
I) 
the desire for economic and material well-being.l 
!h.2. natur,: 9! integration. How, then, can one define 
"unityt1 or "integration," terms used often in the discussion 
of Western European co-operative ventures? In 1957, c. 
Grove Haines posed a number of questions about the meaning 
of tlintegration" and then provided some of the answers. 
Does integration mean the dissolution of the separate 
sovereign states of Europe to be replaced by a single 
sovereign state? No, Haines answered his own question, no 
one has proposed this or is likely to do so. Or would it 
mean formation of some type of federal union, modeled after 
the United States or SWitzerland, tlwhere certain powers are 
delegated to the federal authority while the remainder are 
reserved to the individual members?" This, he said, may be 
more desirable and praoticable, but there are formidable 
obstacles, and neither the U.S. or SWiss examples are wholly 
relevant, "given the common culture and tradition in the 
first case and the accidents of geography and historical 
circumstanoes in the second. 1I Then Haines asks if integra­
tion does not mean something less ambitious than the former 
examples, and responds that the indications of the previous 
decade (he was speaking of 1947-57 although the comment 
lJ. A. Laponce, The Government of the Fifth Repub1io 
(Berkeley. california: University of california Press, 
1961), pp. 20-21. 
• • 
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seems	 still valid today) are that integration has tended to 
be identified with more limited measures. Pinally, he 
points out. obVlously there is no commonly accepted defini­
tion for	 integration. although. "also obviously." it has 
deflnite	 political lmplications for most of those who use 
1the word. 
Haas ~akes this notion of political implications and 
comes up	 wlth this definitlon of politioal integration: 
The process whereby political aotors in several 
distinot natlonal settlngs are persuaded to shift 
their loyalties. expeotations and polltical activl­
ties toward a new center. whose instltutions possess 
or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existlng natlonal 
states••• The ~ result .2!. !....Erocess 9!.. political
lntegration 11 ~ ~ political community. super­
imposed .2!.!I !!!.2 pre-existing .2!l!!.2 
Ben T. Moore says that a group becomes more closely 
integrated as it mOVes toward the following goals: 
1.	 A common strategy and military establishments. 
inclUding nuclear weapons, readY to cope with 
threats to its security Whether such threats are 
aimed directly at the group or arlse outside It. 
2.	 A common market includlng free movement of capltal, 
technology, and people••• 
3.	 A common foreign policy supported by both the mili­
tary establishment and the integrated economy. • • 
4.	 Democratic arra~ements for making the necessary 
declsions. • • 
Ie. Grove Haines, What Future for Europe? (New York: 
The Foreign Policy Association, Inc••-SUXY ~6, 1957). pp. 
6-7. 
2Haas,	 ~. cit., p. 16. 
3Ban T. Moore, NATO and the Future 2!. Europe (New 
York: Harper & Brotheri:-19'5S>7P. 227. 
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:!:!!!. nature 2!. supranationality. If defin1tiona of 
"integration" and UUnited Europe" are hard to pin down, 
there is another word in common use in discussions of the 
integration movement whose definition perhaps is clearer but 
whose implioations are controversial. That is "supranation­
ality, II a.nd. Baas again is valuable to turn to for a balanoed 
idea of what the term means. Haas wrote that General de 
Gaulle equated supranationality With a "federalism" which de 
Gaulle detested, while Jean Monnet identified the term with 
a federalism of whioh Monnet is a leading partisan, being 
oonsidered the father of the system of regional government 
developed in the Community of the Six. However, said Haas, 
both men mistake the essence of the phenomenon. The essence 
of supranationallty is in the tendency for economic and 
social deoisions to "spillover" into the realm of the 
political, nto arise from and further influenoe the politi­
cal a.spirations of the major groupings and parties in demo­
eratic societies." The supranational style stresses the 
indireet IIpenetration" of the political by way of the 
eeonomic beoause "purely" eoonomic decisions always acquire 
political significance in the minds of the participants. In 
short, the kind of economics and social questions here dealt 
with are IIthose at the very core of the modern welfare 
16 
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state." 
In the more specific realm of considering suprana­
tionality in reference to the institutions of the Six, Jean 
Ray, president of the Commission of the European Communities 
(the E.E.C., the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom), told 
a December, 1968 press conference that the word "is meant to 
specify the existence of a certain number of powers that 
have been vested in the Community institutions. n The term, 
he said, does not imply any idea of superiority. Further, 
Hay added, the powers vested in the institutions which he 
mentioned could not be dispensed with "Without injury to the 
very substance of the Community.n2 
Further uses of the term, especially a more thorough 
analysis of General de Gaulle's view, will be given later. 
IV. THE BACKGROUND OF DE GAULLE 
It is now necessary to concentrate more directly on 
Charles de Gaulle and to begin by mentioning some aspects of 
his background which have had a bearing on the view of inte­
gration he held while French president. De Gaulle was born 
1Ernst B. Haas t "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New 
Europe," International R~ionalism (Boston: Llttle, Brown 
and Company), pp. 151-15. 
2Jean Ray, II Community Balance Sheet and Prospects, II 
Bulletin of the European Communities, II (January, 1969),
ij. . - - ­
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in French Flanders, in Lille, in 1890. His parents and 
grandparents have been described as "teaohers, philosophers 
and historians--deeply patriotic, puritanically catholic, 
1
and strongly intellectual." 
De Gaulle himself, in his war memoirs, tells his 
readers that his father was ua thoughtful, cultivated, tra­
ditional man, imbued With a feeling for the dignity of 
Franoe. He made me aware of her history." His mother, de 
Gaulle addS, "had an uncompromising passion for her oountry, 
2
equal to her religiOUS piety." 
In the early pages of his memoirs, de Gaulle provides 
the reader With a striking description of his thoughts about 
his country Which in capsule form provides a key for under­
standing his attitudes toward the entire range of his policy 
and actions in later years. De Gaulle wrote: 
All my life I have thought of France in a certain 
way. This is inspired by sentiment as muoh as by 
reason. The emotional side of me tends to imagine 
France, like the princess in the fairy stories or 
the Madonna in the fresooes, as dedicated to an 
exalted and exceptional destiny. Instinctively I 
have the feeling that Providence has created her 
either for oomplete success or for exemplary mis­
fortunes. If, in spite of this, mediocrity shows 
in her acts and deeds, it strikes me as an absurd 
anomaly, to be imputed to the faults of Frenchmen, 
not to the geniUS of the land. But the positive 
IF. Roy Willis (ed.), De Gaulle: Anachronism, 
Realist, or Prophet? (New York: Hott, Rinehart and Winston, 
1907), p.~. 
2 Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of 
Charles ~ Gaulle (New York~Simon and Sohuster, 1964), p. 
). 
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side of my mind also assures me that France is not 
really herself unless in the front rank. • • In 
short, to ~ mind, France cannot be France without 
greatness. l 
De Gaulle, of course, was a military man, who 
attended the officers' training academy of Saint-Cyr. 
Wounded three times in World War I, captured at Verdun and a 
prisoner for two years, he turned to military theory after 
the war, teaching tactics and military history. During the 
period between the two world wars, de Gaulle also served on 
,­
the staff of Marshal Petain at the Superior War Council, 
served periods of active duty in Germany and at Beirut, 
later becoming secretary of the Superior Council of National 
Defense. During that period, of 1932-36, he published two 
well-known books on military topios: !!!! ~ 2.! the SWord 
(La Pi1 de 1) ~Ple) and Toward a career gm.y (!2.!:! tarm~ .!!! 
m6tier) • 
In June, 1940, after the start of World War II, de 
Gaulle was brought int~ Paul Reynaud's cabinet as under­
secretary of war, a position he held only 11 days. After de 
G~ulle had learned Reynaud had resigned and the new premier, 
/Petain, wanted to seek an armistice with the Germans, he 
decided to leave Franoe and oreate a oenter of French resis­
I 
tanoe in London. This decision to break with Petain "was 
IDe Gaulle, ~. ~., p. 3. 
19 
lthe turning point in his life ... 
By the time of the D-Day invasion of Europe, de 
Gaulle had an army of 250,000 men and was recognized as its 
head by the Resistance in France. On August 25, 1944, he 
",.
strode triumphantly down the Champs Elysees of a liberated 
Paris and for the next 18 months continued to govern France 
through a coalition. But on January 20, 1946, annoyed with 
the political parties' preparation of a constitution for the 
Fourth Republic "which seemed to de Gaulle to perpetuate the 
governmental weakness of the Third, It he resigned and went 
into self-imposed eXile. 2 In between that time and the time 
of his investiture as premier in 1958 during the crisis in 
Algeria, de Gaulle was involved in the creation of the Rally 
of the Frenoh People (H.P.F.) and the writing of his 
memoirs. As matters turned out, de Gaulle, after taking 
control of France's destiny again in 1958, was able to end 
the Algerian war in four yea.rs, rule for a consecutive 
period of almost 11 years, and make a deep impression on the 
course of events not only in France but throughout Europe 
and, indeed, the world. 
V. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BEFORE 1958 
What really can be considered as Europe's first 
supranational body was the European Coal and Steel Community, 
21Willis, £E. cit., p. 4. Ibid., p. 5. 
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proposed in 1950, by Robert Sohuman, the Frenoh foreign 
minister, a plan aotually formulated by Jean Monnet from his 
1position as head of the Frenoh Planning Commission. The 
Frenoh support for a oommon market for coal and steel seemed 
to be based largely on the idea of oontaining Germany, or at 
least substituting interdependence for national antagonisms. 
The French also looked on the creation of some form of union 
as a first step toward some type of superstate in which 
Franoe--perhaps together with England--would predominate. 
Coal and steel were ohosen partly because they were indus­
tries symbolizing the struggle between Franoe and Germany 
and were the foundations of armaments and military power, 
and partly beoause they formed an eoonomic base whioh would 
2be enlarged to inolude other industries. The Coal and 
Steel Community bore the mark of supranationality in that it 
oreated a High Authority composed of members appointed by 
their respective governments but expeoted to act indepen­
dently of national institutions. Britain, however, refused 
to participate, and Monnet reluctantly deoided to go ahead 
Without the English. On April 18, 1951, the Treaty of Paris 
was signed by Franoe, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Nether­
lands and Luxembourg--the nation-states to become known as 
the Slx--and on July 25, 1952, the B.C.S.C. eame tnto eXls­
2 61 CUrtis, £E. cit., p. 16• ~ •• pp. 1 -17. 
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1tence. 
!h! European Defense Community. In the meantime, 
European governments also were discussing, at the height of 
the cold war, a common defense effort, and a treaty to 
establish a European Defense Community (E.n.C.) was signed 
in May, 1952. This time, however, France was reluctant to 
go along, as most certainly was General de Gaulle. The 
treaty touched perhaps his most sensitive nerve, national 
control over the French armed forces. Its integrated Euro­
pean army, whioh would include French units, was completely 
2 
unacceptable to him. With the E.D.C., there were a number 
of parallels to the E.C.S.C., one of the first being that it 
again grew out of concern for the containment of Germany. 
But containment of Germany within the E.n.C. also meant 
German rearmament. To the extreme right and Communists in 
France, rearmament was not to be tolerated under any circum­
stances. But perhaps the major opposition in France came 
from the fact that the British again were holdouts. The 
opposition arose from the geographical definition of the 
treaty, which limited it to a narrow oontine~ frame after 
1 Ibid., p. 17.
-
2w• W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the World (Syracuse, New 
York: Syracuse univerSIty Press:-I9bbJ, PP. 196-197. 
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the expressed opposition of Britain to joining it. France 
at this point, however, still had much of its enthusiasm for 
wider European unity, but as a counterpoise to the contain­
ment of Germany, along with the defeated state's recovery, 
France wanted the inclusion of Great Britain, a firm commit­
ment from the United States, and. the "direct association of 
the French Empire.,,2 
!h! European Economic Community. So on August 3D, 
1954, the French Parliament refused to ratify the E.D.C. 
treaty. But if there was a mood of pessimism among integra­
tionists aver this defeat, it was largely shaken off within 
a year and the move toward the greatest accomplishment of 
integration. the European Economic Community. was started. 
The treaty was drafted with an eye on the failure of the 
E.D.C., and thus contained a lesser ingredient of supra-
nationality than the Coal and Steel Community. The formal 
powers of the E.E.C. executive organ were ltm1ted, and. a 
corresponding increase was given to the Council of Ministers, 
in relation to the Treaty of Paris, so as to avoid a rejec­
tion of the treaty by France. The challenging words "supra­
nationality" and "High Authority" were avoided deliberately, 
lSimon SerfatT, France. De Gaulle and Europe (Balti­
more: The John Hopkins Press, 196'S1, pp.-m-!5. 
2Ibid.., p. 18. 
c<>~; _ 
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1
and the more neutral "commission" substituted. On March 25, 
1957, the Treaties of Rome were signed, adding two new 
institutions--the E.E.C. and the European Atomic Energy Com­
munity--to the previous Coal and Steel Community. The two 
new organs actually went into eXistence on January 1, 1958-­
several months before Charles de Gaulle came baek into 
power. The treaties were signed in France despite opposi­
tion of the combined Communist, Gaullist and extreme right 
opposition in Parliament. That the French did approve the 
treaties was due to a spirit of compromise of the positions 
taken by the Six during the negotiations. France had wanted 
integration in a number of sectors rather than the general 
community that was produced, but did obtain a number of con­
cessions, such as agreements tor the marketing of agricul­
tural products and escape clauses that would allow her to 
2
continue subsidizing exports for a time. 
!h! European Free Trade Association. Britain, of 
oourse, did not seek to join the E.E.C. With the formula­
tion of the new organization of the SiX, other countries of 
Europe sought to form an organization concerned exclus1vely 
With the liberalization of industrial trade and With no 
political objectives--whioh clearly were a part of the 
Treaty of Rome. They Wished to increase trade With one 
21 Curtis, ~. ~., p. 21. Ibid.
-
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another and strengthen their individual and collective posi­
1 
tiona in relation to the new E.E.C. In 1959, representa­
tives of seven states--Austri&, Denmark, Great Britain, 
Norway, Portugal, SWeden and Switzerland--met and within 
eight weeks agreed on establishing the European Free Trade 
Assooiation, or E.F.T.A. Now it was the Europe of the Seven 
confronting the Europe of the Six. 
The E.F.T.A. was built on principles agreeable to 
Britain--the progressive lowering of mutual tariffs on 
industrial goods, no reference to agricultural produots, no 
agreement conoerning the tariffs applicable to trading with 
2third oountries, and the rule of unanimity. It was to have 
been a tool of pressure on the Six to eventually obtain oon­
cessions for the British acoess to the Common Market on 
terms more to British liking. But this move failed. Among 
the weaknesses of the assooiation was the faot that Britain 
dominated it--by representing half the eoonomic power of the 
Seven as measured in the gross national product and the size 
of external trade. J 
1Ibid., p. 24. 
2Kulski, £E. oit., p. 236. J Ibid.
-
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CHAPTER II 
DE GAULLE IN POWER--1958-1963 
On May 28, 1958, French PresIdent Rene/' Coty announced 
that Charles de Gaulle had been asked to form a government. 
On June I, by a 329 to 224 vote of the National Assembly, 
the General was invested as premier, and given power to 
govern by decree for six months and prepare a new constitu­
tion for popular ratIfication. 
I. THE DIRECTORATE 
De Gaulle's most pressing concern during those first 
years after his return to power was the Algerian situation, 
but he did not confine hImself to national and colonial 
affairs. One of his most important first steps was to seek 
a "directorate" of three, includ.ing the United States, 
Britain and France, which would, in his eyes, replace the 
directorate of two in NATO of the UnIted States and Britain. 
Roy C. Macridis notes that the de Gaulle memorandum on the 
matter, dated September 23. 1958, remains technically 
secret. but a version he lists suggests the establishment of 
a political and military organization of the U.S., France 
and Britain which would: 
a.	 Elaborate a common military and political strategy 
for our planet. 
26 
b. Set up for each possible theater of operations
allied commands. 
c. Decide, when the occasion arose, on the utilization 
of the weapons of massive destruction. • .1 
The United States, however, rejected the plan, and 
thus there probably is some basis for the argument that the 
anti-NATO, anti-American diplomacy of de Gaulle's Fifth 
Republic was a substitute for the directorate plan rejected 
by the United states, jealous of keeping its nuclear trigger 
unhampered. 
On the matter of the Treaties of Rome, de Gaulle 
promised that he would tear them up after his return to 
2 power. But when he did come to power in 1958 he imple­
mented the provisions of the treaties honestly, perhaps 
hoping to nibble away the supranational elements of the 
3Common Market as the years passed by. There certainly were 
aspects of the E.E.C. treaty that de Gaulle did not like, 
including the right of the Commission to submit its own pro­
posals to the Council of Ministers; the plan to allow the 
Council of Ministers after eight years to make decisions on 
a number of important matters by a majority vote, and the 
creation of a European Partiamentary Assembly composed of 
4delegates of national parliaments. 
laoy C. Macrldis (ed.), De Gaulle, Implacable Ally 
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), p. 10j. 
2Kulskl. £R. ~., p. 198. 3Ibid • 
4
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Ibid. t p. 197. 
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II. VIEWS ON THE E.E.C. AND EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION 
De Gaulle had little to say in his public statements 
in the 1958-59 period about European unity or the Common 
Market, however. But after the failure of the summit con­
ference in 1960, President de Gaulle said that France wanted 
to work toward contributing to the construction of Western 
Europe into a "political, eoonomic, oultural and. human 
group, organized for action, progress and defense." But, he 
warned, the nations "which are becoming assooiated must not 
oease to be themselves," and the path to be followed "must 
be that of organized cooperation between states, while wait­
ing to achieve, perhaps, an imposing confederation. Ifl 
De Gaulle then added: 
On our old continent, the organization of a western 
group, at the very least equivalent to that whioh 
eXists in the east, may one day, without risk to the 
independenoe and the freedom of eaoh nation and taking 
into aooount the probable evolution of political 
regimes, establish a European entente from the 
Atlantio to the Urals. Then Europe, no longer split 
in two by ambitions and ideologies that would become 
out-of-date, would again be the heart of oiviliza­
tion. • • • But also, the oohesion of this great 
and strong European community would lead vast ooun­
tries in other continents, whioh are advancing toward 
power, also to take the way of cooperat~on, rather 
than to yield to the temptation of war. 
lCharles de Gaulle, Major Addresses, statements ~ 
Press Conferenoes of General Charles Cie Gaulle, May 12,i9,2S-Januarz ~, 1%j"" >( New York: French Embassy, Press and 
nformat{on D vision , p. 78. 
2 Ibid • 
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The passage above contains some key elements in the 
thought of de Gaulle. He is stressing a nationalistic point 
of view in asserting that while states of Europe should 
co-operate, they must remain independent as well in matters 
deemed vital to their self-interests. He is speaking as a 
European, too, as well as a Frenchman, in asserting the 
historical, cultural and political superiority, in his view, 
of European civilization. He is saying that such a cooperat­
ing organization of states could lead to world peace and 
stability, mentioning "vast countries in other continents" 
in a sense forced to cooperate because of the power of the 
European entity. But, as he said, this would be "an imposing 
confederation,f1 thus stressing there would be limits on any 
supranationality of the united body. Not clearly stated. 
but implied throughout the statement, is that in this most 
powerful group of states on the face of the earth, France 
would be one of the major powers. 
In September, 1960, de Gaulle then outlined more 
clearly his thoughts on the role of the organizations of the 
Six that had been set up by the Treaties of Paris and Rome. 
FIrst of all. he stated that the states of Europe "are the 
only entities that have the right to order and the authority 
to act. II He added: 
Of course. it 1s true that, while waiting to come 
to grips with Europe's problem and tackle it as a 
whole, it has been possible to institute certain 
organs that are more or less extranational. These 
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organs have their technical value, but they do not 
have, they cannot have authority and, consequently, 
political effectiveness. As long as nothing serious 
happens, they function without much difficulty, but 
as soon as a tragic situation appears, a major prob­
lem to be solved, it can then be seen that one lIHigh 
Authority" or another has no authority over the various 
national categories and that only the States have it••• 
Once again, it 1s qUite natural that the States of 
Europe have at their disposal specialized organs for 
the problems that they have in common, in order to 
help formulate and, if need be, follow up their deoi­
sions;lbut the right to take these decisions is theirs 
alone. 
Thus de Gaulle here relegates organizations such as 
the Coal and Steel High Authority or the E.E.C. Commission 
to a role of technioal experts, who can help the governments 
of the states prepare decisions and later help implement 
them. 
II. THE FOUCHET PLAN 
In 1961, de Gaulle expanded his ideas on the politi­
cal organization af Europe in what was known as the Pauchet 
Plan, a plan whioh was aborted. It is olear that de Gaulle 
neither wanted nor believed Europe was ready to form into 
one supranational community. The plan was built on the 
basis of existing states and fooused on intergovernmental 
rather than supranational meohanisms. 
What de Gaulle had proposed was to bring together. at 
regular intervals, the heads of European states on a oonsul­
1Ibid., p. 93. 
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tation basis and he suggested a European referendum to get 
the idea of oooperation aooepted by the people of the vari­
ous states. Then a oommission of experts would prepare the 
proposals submitted to the eonferenoe of the chiefs of 
state. He also envisioned a European parliamentarY assembly 
of the three organizations of the Six. While these sugges­
tions might have been accepted by the SiX, writes Robert 
Aron, de Gaulle in 1952 made uan abrupt and very definite 
volte-~." He cut down the part that would be played by 
the three existing organizations, as well as that of the 
proposed parliamentary assembly, "denying it any powers of 
1
action. " 
In a press conference on May 15, 1962, General de 
Gaulle made some pointed comments on the FOllchet Plan and 
the politieal organization of Europe. While giving a mini­
mal sort of oompliment to the work done to that polnt by the 
E.E. C., de Gaulle said that in the French view. "this eoo­
nomic construction 1s not enough. 11 Western Europe must form 
itself politioally. Europe must have institutiOns that will 
lead it to form a political union, just as it "already is a 
un10n 1n the eoonomic sphere." It is the states that give 
the Common Market reality and efficiency, "all the more so 
as it is impossible to take any far-reaching economic mea­
lRobert Aron, !n EXilanation of De Gaulle (New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 966), p. IS9. 
-----------------
)1 
1 
sure without oommitting a political aotion. 1t Thus, said de 
Gaulle: 
It is a politloa1 action, when tariffs are dealt 
with in oommon, when ooal-mining areas are oonverted, 
when wages and sooia1 welfare funds are made the same 
in the six states, When each state allows workers 
from the other five states to settle on its territory, 
When decrees are consequently taken and When Parlia­
ment is asked to vote neoessary laws, funds and sanc­
tions. It is a political action when agriculture is 
included in the Common Market. • • • It is a political 
action when one negotiates With Great Britain on the2request that it has made to enter the Common Market. 
But during the same press oonference, he rejected 
merging the six states into a "supranational entity, If and 
the election of a "so-called" European parliament, which 
would "lay down the law for the six states. n In this "inte­
grated	 Europe,n there would Itperhaps be no policy at all." 
But, then, perhaps "this world would follow the lead of some 
outsider who did have a po1icY." There would perhaps be a 
federator, he said, "but the federator would not be Euro-
pean,'1	 and here the General is thinking about the United 
3 
states. 
Thus it seems that de Gaulle, after a few seeming 
concessions to a federal system, returned to his own ideas 
of a confederation, and with the idea of French hegemony 
IDe Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1958-1964, pp. 174-176. 
2De Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1958-1964, pp. 176-177. 
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backing it up. And while dramatically stressing the need 
for a Western European political union in his 1962 state­
ment. the proposal was given less and less attention in 
future statements and by 1964 was only being given passing 
mention. 
But despite his professed dislike of supranational 
institutions. on May 20. 1962. only five days after his 
press conference. he disclosed the reason why he could 
accept the Common Market despite its supranational aspects: 
"We have created an economio community among several coun­
tries of Western Europe. which is beginning to bear fruit. 
and which will be. I believe, especially to France's advan­
tage. lt otherwise. he declared matter-of-factly. "we would 
1 
not have joined it. II 
IV • THE VIEWS OF BRITAIN 
the 
new 
While the Common Market was achieving suooesses on 
continent. politicians in Great Britain were taking a 
look at the E.E.C. and at their own position in E.F.T.A., 
as head of the Commonwealth and in relation to the power of 
the United States and Soviet Union. On August 2, 1961. 
Harold I~cmll1an arose in the House of Commons to make 
formal application to join the E.E.C., marking, as Drew 
lAron. ~. oit., p. 190. 
.~ 
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Middleton put it, a farewell to the "proud independence" 
that once was England's.l Macmillan's speech was above all 
an admission of Britain's inability to maintain independent 
economic, military and political strength even faintly com­
mensurate with that of the United States or Soviet Union. 
It indicated Britain's willingness to seek in a time of 
peace that kind of alliance it frequently resorted to in war 
and just as frequently abandoned once the war was won. The 
people of Britain, Middleton said, "were embarking on a 
course that ran contrary to some of their deepest convic­
2 
tiona and most abiding traditions." 
Britain had declined an invitation to join the Coal 
and Steel Community, and had refused to participate in the 
negotiations for the Common 11arket. It was a matter of 
history that England was opposed to unifica.tion of the Euro­
pean continent, and had fought wars to prevent it. But in 
the early 19608 it was a different question; Britain found 
herself in a '"different position in strength !1!-~-vis the 
continental states, and the challenge came not in a military 
sense. but in an economic one from a group of states that 
had voluntarily assooiated to accomplish certain goals. 
There was relative stagnation in the British eoonomy while 
1Drew Middleton, !h! St£reme Choi cs : Brita,1n and 
Europe (New York: Alfred A. opf, 19b3), p. 3. --­
2 Ibid. t pp. J- 5· 
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the Six were booming. The Commonwealth was becoming a less 
significant part of British commerce. The Empire was being 
liquidated. In addition, there were British supporters of 
entry into the E.E.C. who cited political grounds as a 
reason to seek Common Market membershiP.l 
So negotiations began in October, 1961. with Ireland 
and Denmark following the British example. The negotiations 
were suspended in August. 1962. resumed in September, 1962, 
and then terminated abruptly in January. 1963. Charles de 
Gaulle had "vetoed" British membership, had drummed Britain 
out of the E.E.C. even before it could enter. 
v . THE VETO OF BRITAIN 
As was customary. de Gaulle used a press conference 
on January 14, 1963. to make his statement. He spoke at 
length. first pointing to the nreal factors of the problem." 
The members of the E.E.C. "had many more similarities than 
differences between them." The Six all were continental 
states. linked together physically. as well as in social 
progress and technologinal capability, where they were 
"moving forward at more or less the same pace. ft Among them 
there eXisted "no kind of political grievance, no border 
disputes, no rivalry for domination or power. II On the oon­
lCurtis, Western European Integration, p. 25· 
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tra.ry, there was a "feeling of solidarity between them," 
oWing to the awareness they had of "together possessing an 
important part of the origins of our civilization, and also 
1
with regard to their security.1I 
While it thus was ~ychologically and. materially pos­
sible to organize an economic community of the Six, this was 
not without difficulty. De Gaulle cited especially the 
problem of agriculture. Also, Britain sought entry, but "on 
its own conditions." This raised for each of the six states 
and for England. problems of a very great dimension, de 
Gaulle said, adding: 
England is, in effect, maritime, insular, linked 
through its trade, markets and. food supply to very 
diverse and often very distant countries. Its 
activities are essentially industria.l and commercial, 
and only slightly agricultural. It has, throughout 
its work, very marked and original customs and tradi­
tions. In short, the nature, structure and economic 
context of England differ profoundly from those of 
the other States of the Continent. 2 
One was sometimes led to believe that the British, in 
applying for membership in the Common Market, agreed to 
"change their own ways even to the point of applying all the 
oonditions aocepted and practiced by the 31x,1I he said, but 
added: 
••• the question is to know if Great Britain can 
at present place itself. with the Continent and like 
it. within a tariff that 1s truly common. give up all 
IDe Gaulle, Major A~dresses, 1958-64. p. 212. 
2
~ 
Ibid., p. 213. 
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preference with regard to the Commonwealth, cease to 
claim that its agriculture be privileged and, even 
more, consider as null and void the commitments it 
has made with the countries that are part of its 
free trade area. That question is the one at 
issue. l 
The entry into the Common Market first of Great Britain and 
then of other countries of the E.F.T.A. would completely 
change the series of adjustments, agreements and regulations 
established a.mong the siX, and "we then would have to 
envisage the construction of another Common Market. tI But 
this II-member or I)-member or IS-member Common Market to be 
built would, without any doubt, "hardly resemble the one the 
Six have bUilt." It is foreseeable that the cohesion of its 
members, "who would be very numerous and very diverse,lI 
would not hold for long and that in the end there would 
appear a oolossal Atlantic Community "under American depend­
dence and leadership which would soon completely swallow up 
2the Europea.n Community.l1 
That is an assumption that can be "perfectly justi­
fied in the eyes of some. but it is not at all what France 
wanted to do and what France is doing, which is a strictly 
European construction. ,,) 
So de Gaulle is saying that Britain could not enter 
the Common Market until she could establish her freedom from 
1 4Ibid., p. 21 • 
~ 
)Ibld. t p. 215. 
y 
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the United States, from the E.F.T.A., from the Commonwealth 
system of economic preference and until she had revised and 
revived her economy to fit into the Common Market. He is 
saying that Britain does not accept the concept of economic 
unity in the B.E.C., but rather sees it as a free trade 
area; even if Britain accepted the Community, or the Commu­
nity acoepted Britain, in present farm, she would obstruot 
further progress within it. Britain would. prevent Europe 
from drawing closer together, toward further un!ty. What­
ever unity de Gaulle wanted in Europe, he did not believe 
"that this union could retain its eohesion if it were linked 
closely with Britain, a nation With global interests in its 
ICommonwealth and its remaining colonies. 1t 
The view presented of de Gaulle's aotion Qy two 
German federalists, Ernst Friedlaender and Katbarina Focke. 
was that de Gaulle at his press conferenoe "showed his true 
self as never before." In oontradiction to the obvious 
facts, they said, he described the negotiations with Britain 
as having no chance of success. De Gaulle closed the door 
on the British because "he can only maintain the French 
olaim to leadership in the absence of Britain." Only With­
out Britain and against the United States "can he pursue his 
IMlddleton, The Supreme Choice, p. ix. 
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policy of a third force in world politics. "I Since new mem­
bers of the E.E.C., according to the Treaty of Rome, oould 
be admitted only by the unanimous vote of the original mem­
bers, there was no possibility of setting aside what had 
been in effeot a veto by de Gaulle. 
Why did de Gaulle use the forum of a press conferenoe 
to make his decision on Britain known? Alfred Grosser 
believes that for the General it must have seemed that the 
suocess of the negotiations was inevitable, and that only 
"some dramatic aot or utterance oould torpedo them. II A 
seoond reason he lists, although not to the complete exclu­
sion of the first, is that perhaps de Gaulle maneuvered, "as 
would a good strateglst,1t with no trace of sentiment. "As 
there oan be no Europe Without France, the five, disappointed 
and rebellious though they may be," would face the alterna­
2tive of continuing its development. And, it might be 
added, of continuing its development in a manner consistent 
with Frenoh desires. As de Gaulle knew and had said earlier, 
Franoe needed the E.E.C., so he was taking a risk in what he 
did. But as he also knew the interest of the other five 
lKatherina Focke and Ernst Friedlaender, "One Man 
Against Europe, n De Gaulle: Anachronism, Realist, or 
Prophet? (New York: Hoit. Rinehart and Winston. 1961). p.
S9. 
2Alfred Grosser. "Positive Aspects of Foreign Policy. II 
De Gaulle: Anachronism, Realtst. ~ Prophet? (New York: 
HOlt, Rinehart ana winston. 19675. p. 101. 
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members was in the continuing development of the E.E.C., 
they would acoept the situation. As Grosser put it, the 
rejection of British entry was considered an offense by 
Franoe's European partners "muoh less because of the sub­
stance than beoause of the diplomatio procedure utilized. 
1Members of a community do not behave in such a fashion." 
VI. MEETING IN THE BAHAMAS 
But the story of rejection of British membership by 
de Gaulle must go farther, namely to the December, 1962, 
meeting in the Bahamas of Britaln' s Harold. Ilfacm1llan and 
Amerioan President John Kennedy. The set of circumstances 
whioh evolved here probably led to the de Gaulle deoision to 
veto &1tain as much or more than any purely economic 
reasons. The Americans had. canoeled the Skybolt missile 
program and. the Bri tlsh decided to abandon the construction 
of delivery instruments and agreed to plaoe their own 
nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO, accepting American 
Polaris missiles instead. 
De Gaulle, at his press conference, interpreted the 
agreement this way: It is a question of oonstituting a 
"so-called multilateral atomic force," in which Britaln 
"would turn over the weapons it has and will have a.nd. in 
lAlfred Grosser. Frenoh Foreign Pollc~ Under de 
Gaulle (Boston: Little Brown and Company, '1<}67), p.2L 
1---------------­
40 
which the Americans would place a few of its own. tt This 
multilateral force would be a.ssigned to the defense of 
Europe and would be under the American NATO command 'Out it 
was nevertheless understood that the British retain the pos­
sibility of withdrawing their atomic weapons for their own 
use should "supreme national interest seem to them to demand 
1tit. Further. the bulk of the Amerioan nuclear force would 
remain outside the multilateral force. under the direct oom­
mand of the Amerioan president. The British would be able 
to obtain the submarine-launched Polaris from America. l De 
Gaulle then told the news conference: 
France has taken note of the Anglo-American Nassau 
agreement. As it was conceived. undoubtedly no one 
will be surprised that we cannot subscribe to it. 
It truly would not be useful for us to buy Polaris 
missiles when we have neither the submarines to launch 
them nor the thermonuclear warheads to arm them. 
Doubtless the day will oome when we will have these 
submarines and these warheads. But that day will be 
long in coming. • • • When we Will one day have these 
submarines and these warheads. what will the Polaris 
missiles then be worth? At that time we will probably 
have missiles of our own invention. In other words, 
for us, in terms of technology. this affair is not 
the question of the moment. 
But also. it does not meet with the principle 
about which I just spoke and Which consists of dis­
posing in our own right of our deterrent force. To 
turn over our weapons to a multilateral force. under 
a foreign oommand. would be to aot contrary to that 
prinoiple of our defense and our policy. • •• 
In sum. we will adhere to the deoision we have 
made: to oonstruot. and if necessary. to employ 
IDe Gaulle. I"1ajor Addresses. 1958-1964-. p .. 218. 
41 
1 
our atomio foroes ourselves. 
To de Gaulle, the Nassau proposal was designed to 
deprive Britain and Franoe of their independent national 
defense, and as for Franoe, he would have nothing to do with 
the idea, whioh would give the U.S. Itthe possibility of 
2
seizing the Frenoh atomio foroes." And if the British 
should follow the Amerioan proposal, it would be in de 
Gaulle's eyes an aooeptanoe of Amerioan supremaoy. Thus 
Britain would be the American Trojan horse and would have to 
be kept out of the Common Market. 
Grosser saw the Kennedy proposal as an improvisation, 
in order that Maomillan wouldn't depart empty-handed from 
the Bahamas meeting. Although it was really an improvisa­
tion, it was presented as a very important acoomplishment, 
and therefore de Gaulle concluded that so important a pro­
posal could not have been improvised and that in fact 
I'1a.cmillan had known about it when he and de Gaulle had met 
earlier in December, 1962. Maomillan, in de Gaulle's view, 
must have known that IInot only would he not give the British 
atomic force as a dowry to Europe, II but that American 000­
J
trol over the British force would be inoreased. In effeot, 
lIbld., p. 219.
 
2Serfaty, France, Q! Gaulle and Europe, p. 127.
 
JGrosser in De Gaulle: Anaohronism, Realist ~
 
Prophet?, pp. 88-89:­
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the Bahamas meeting marked an important date in de Gaulle's 
foreign policy, in regard to integration of Europe and other 
matters. It undoubtedly made him more suspect of Britain 
and of the United States, and tended to free him more to 
disregard their policies and interests. W. W. Kulski saw a 
trio of reasons why de Gaulle was miffed by the whole U.S.­
British scheme. First, the plan was not acceptable because 
of his fundamental desire to keep French defense independent 
and the American plan of nuclear hegemony disregarded his 
1958 triumvirate or directorate plan mentioned earlier: 
second, "no government likes particularly to be told by two 
other governments that they offer it a bargain on whioh it 
had not been oonsulted and Which affects its vital inter­
ests": and besides, de Gaulle was offended by not being 
1 
invited to the oonferenoe in the first plaoe. The whole 
situation must have brought back to de Gaulle unpleasant 
memories of the treatment he believed Unfair that he 
received at the hands of the "Anglo-Saxons" during \vorld \4ar 
II and about whioh more will be said later. 
De Gaulle was not soon to forget the episode. It was 
at another press oonference, on October 26, 1966, when he 
was again asked about the possibility of British entry that 
he recalled the Bahamas proposal while defending himself 
lKUlski, ~ Gaulle and the World, pp. 141-142. 
against accusations that he had blocked European unity. On 
the contrary, he argued. Mentioning not only lithe untiring 
contribution of our Ministers and our experts in building 
the edifice" of the Common Market, he also stressed ffthat on 
numerous occasions, it was thanks to the clearness and the 
firmness of our authorities' action that the undertaking did 
not stray off into blind alleys." De Gaulle added: 
Thus, in 1963, we were led to put an end to the 
negotiations that Britain opened in Brussels With a 
View to entering the organization; not, to be sure, 
that we despaired of ever seeing that great island 
people truly wed its destiny to that of the continent, 
but the fact is that it was not then in a pOSition to 
apply the common rules and that it had just, in 
Nassau, sworn an allegiance outside of a Europe
that would be a real Europe. Now, by continuing 
fruitlessly, these negotiations were actually £re­
venting the Six from building their community. 
VII. THE FRANCo-GERMAN TREATY 
At any rate, the thunderbolts de Gaulle hurled from 
the Elys6e Palace at the beginning of 196) marked a new era 
of independence, or intransigence, for France and de Gaulle. 
It is a convenient division point in tracing his career as 
French president. But perhaps one other event should be 
briefly described before looking into the latter siX years 
of his presidency. That event was the conolusion of a 
lCharles de Gaulle, Major Addresses, statements and
 
Press Conferences of General chirle~ de Gaulle, ~~ch 11,
 
1961i'-r/fal 12. f9b7 TNew York: French Embassy, Press and
 
Information DiVision), p. 150.
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"common declaration and treatyll between France and the 
Federal Republic of Germany on January 22, 1963. De Gaulle 
had set the stage in that same January 14 press conference 
when he noted that for the "first time in many generations, 
the Germans and Gauls realize their solidarity." This 
solidarity eXists from the standpoint of their security, 
from an economic standpoint, from the standpoint of cultural 
1 
influence and development. Referring to the upcoming meet­
ing of de Gaulle, German Chance11or Konrad Adenauer and 
other French and German officials, de Gaulle said: 
The French-German meeting that will shortly be 
held here will permit us, we most sincerely hope, to 
organize our cooperation better than it is organized 
already. It goes without saying that there is 
nothing there that either resembles or tends toward 
the building up between Germany and France of some 
kind of exclusive community. The two countries have 
decided and are committed to being an integral part 
of Europe, such as it is built on the qasis of the 
Rome Treaty. Moreover, it is absolutely impossible 
to see how the more effective rapprochement betl'reen 
the Frenoh and German peoples would in any way what­
soever harm the fraternity of Italy and France, a 
frateI'm ty that is two thousand years old and which 
is today more alive than ever, or harm the olose 
links that the oenturies have forged bet!een us and 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. 
In fact, the French president concluded that by 
tightening their co-operation, Germany and France would be 
setting an example that may be useful to the co-operation of 
everyone. 
IDe Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1958-1964, p. 221. 
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~ 
The treaty itself called for periodic meetings of the 
heads of state of the two countries as well as their foreign 
ministers and military ohiefs. The two states agreed to 
consult eaoh other, prior to any decision, "on all important 
questions of foreign policy, and in the first plaoe on ques­
tions of common interest, with a view to arriving, insofar 
as possible, at a similar position." This consultation was 
to cover areas including problems relating to the European 
Communities and European political co-operation; East-West 
1
relations; SUbjects dealt with in NATO, and other matters. 
It was a de Gaulle objective to establish a special 
relationship With Bonn similar to that which eXisted between 
London and \'1ashington. Adenauer seemed to look upon things 
somewhat differently, being an ardent integrationist, who 
believed that the age of national states had oome to an end. 
In Europe, Adenauer believed, the habit of thinking in terms 
of national states must be broken. As a result of World War 
II and the development of teohnology, inoluding weapons of 
mass destruction, a new set of oonditions Obtained in the 
world, and to him the answer in Europe was integration, 
2
Which he saw also as lie. prooess of regeneration. n But 
Adenauer also was strongly interested in the "glorious ulti­
ll~cridis, Q! Gaulle, Implacable~, pp. 186-191. 
2Konrad Adenauer, World Indivlsibl! With Liberty ~ 
Justioe for All (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
1955), pp:-6-7. 
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mate goal--the ending of future European wars," and. thus 
undoubtedly would be attracted by a treaty between two 
states that had fought with each other three times during 
his lifetime. So the treaty was largely one more between 
two ohiefs of state than between France and Germany--for the 
treaty was never implemented to any great degree. The 
Gaullist point of view was that the signing of the treaty 
"implied Germany's rallying to France's thesis of indepen­
1dence from the United states. 1I But the Germans, while 
attracted by certain aspects of the treaty, refused to 
implement it at the expense of NATO and its relations With 
the United States. For one thing, Adenauer was not to be 
chancellor of the Federal RepUblic for much longer, and both 
the upper and lower houses of the German parliament accepted 
it only with reservations. The upper house, or German 
Federal Council, adopted the treaty along With an interpre­
tive resolution that welcomed the treaty but invited the 
government to carry it out along the main lines of Germany 
foreign policy, including common defense within the frame­
work of the Atlantic Alliance, European union with British 
participation and the reunification of Germany. These, 
needless to say, were not the objectives of de Gaulle. The 
lower chamber of the German parliament went even further, 
lserfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe, p. 1J2. 
attaohing a preamble to the treaty. whioh mentioned. among 
other things. the "maintenanoe and strengthening of the 
Allianoe of free peoples. in partioular of the olose associa­
tion between Europe and the United States of America." and 
the unification of Europe "according to the patterns set up 
by the existing European Communities and by admitting Great 
1Britain and other states which want to join." 
Thus the aotion was in effect an approval of closer 
ties with France--if they could be obtained--but not at the 
expense of being a tool of de Gaulle's foreign policy. 
especially his ideas of independence from the United States 
and refusal to allow Britain to join the European Communi­
ties. The earlier warmth which de Gaulle had shown for 
Germany was to cool down in his future statements. 
lKulskl. De Gaulle and the World, PP. 276-277. 
CHAPrER III 
LATTER YEARS OF THE PRESIDENCY 
B,y the middle of 1963, then, there was disappointment 
among European integrationists, skepticism among the Germans 
and hostil!ty among many Americans to the independent, 
nationalistic course de Gaulle now was embarked upon. 
I. THE AGRICULTURAL CRISIS 
One thing that bothered Americans was de Gau11e's 
outspoken criticism of the American stance in Vietnam. And 
in Europe de Gaulle, in effect, provoked a crisis, which, on 
the surface, was over the failure of the Six to agree on 
details of a system for financing a common agricultural 
policy. To de Gaulle, the problem was an important one. He 
asserted at a January, 1964, news conference that of the six 
states of the Common Market, France was the most interested 
in the agricultural question since "we are the ones who can 
supply the most grain, meat, milk, butter, cheese, wine and. 
with Italy, the most fruits and vegetables, whioh led us to 
1 
appear the most pressing 1n Brussels." 
This common agricultural policy that came to the fore 
involved deciding how the costs of the policy were to be 
IDe Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1958-1964, p. 254• 
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allocated and benefits distributed; it also involved demands 
of some of the members that, along with the transfer of 
authority to dispense the large sums of money involved, 
should go a transfer of power to the European Parliament and 
the proposal of the E.E.C. Commission that it should be 
given its own sources of financial support from the proceeds 
of industrial tariffs and the agricultural levy system. The 
formal deadline for decisions on these matters--either of 
whioh could be expected to limit the ability of any one gov­
1 
ernment to manipulate the system--was July I, 1965. 
On midnight of June 30, 1965, the French walked out of 
the negotiations; and in the next week 1t became evident 
that the French grievan.ces went far beyond the agricultural 
financing matter, extending to the E.E.C. Commission, its 
strategy and lIpolitlcal pretensions,n the voting system 
agreed to in the Treaty of Rome, and the "reluctanceU of its 
partners to liberate themselves from the domination of the 
2Uni ted states. Onoe again at the Elysee Palace in Paris, 
at a press conference, de Gaulle gave his views of the 
matter in his oharacteristically blunt fashion. The three 
treatles--E.E.C., E.C.S.C. and Euratom--were oonoluded 
before Franoe I s recovery in 1958. They therefore made 
lLeon N. Lindberg, Jllntegration as a Source of Stress 
in the European Community System, II International Regionalism 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965', p. 236. 
2 Ibid • 
~ 
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allowance primarily for "what the others requested." Each 
of the treaties "instituted an appearance of an executive in 
the form of a commission independent from the States" and an 
"appearance of a legislature in the form of an Assembly 
bringing together members of the various parliaments. If This 
claim held by a "technocracy, for the most part foreign, 
destined to infringe upon France's democracy in settling 
problems that dictate the very eXistence of our country," 
could not suit France's purposes once she was determined to 
take her destiny into her own hands. What France wanted, he 
indicated. was a community that would be fair and reasonable: 
Fair: that means that agricultural products • • • 
should be included in the Common Market concurrently
With industrial goods. Reasonable: that means that 
nothing which is important at present in the organiza­
tion, and later in the operation of the Common Market 
of the Six, should be decided and, even more, applied. 
except by the responsible public authorities in the 
siX States, that is, the Governments controlled by 
the Parliaments. l 
De Gaulle continued to denigrate attlifferent concept 
of a European Federation," in which the countries would 
"lose their national personalities, and in Which, further­
more for want of a federator • • • would be ruled by some 
teohnocratic, stateless and irresponsible Areopagus." 
France is opposing this plan with one that allows organized 
oooperation among the states, lIevolving, dOUbtless. toward a 
IDe Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1964-1967, p. 95. 
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1
confederation." 
While Leon Lindberg notes one might interpret the 
boycott and de Gaulle's speech so extreme and provocative 
that they could be considered the first stage in a French 
withdrawal from the Community or moves to force the other 
members to break it up rather than capitulate, the interpre­
tation seems dOUbtful. If France withdrew or the system 
collapsed. France would have foregone its major level for 
intervention in its partners' internal affairs and its chief 
source of influence over the other five's policies toward 
the United states. Soviet Union. and East Europe. and the 
break, too. would be very costly to both French industry and 
agriculture. 2 
Rather de Gaulle intended to turn integration to his 
own purposes rather than undo the structure. France at this 
point in the mid-l96os was not trapped by integration 1n the 
sense that de Gaulle was less subject to internal controls 
than politicians in the other countries and thus was the 
only one wll1ing--or able--to threaten to destroy the system 
3if he didn't get his way. 
There was obViously internal opposition, however. to 
de Gaulle's attitude toward the Community this time, and it 
lIbido 2Lindberg. 2£. ~•• pp. 237-238. 
~ 
3Ibid., p. 239. 
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may have shown up in the elections in December, 1965, in 
which what was considered as a considerable anti-de Gaulle 
protest vote was cast. 
The Commission, in effect, had ended up by playing de 
Gaulle's game in the 1965 plan--which was as much of a 
challenge to de Gaulle as de Gaulle's veto of Britain was to 
the Community spirit. The Commission was attempting to 
force de Gaulle to choose between French farmers' interests 
and the French national interest in a "European Europe" for 
agriculture on the one hand, and his own hostility to supra­
nationality and the French national interest--as viewed by 
de Gaulle--on the other. l 
By the spring of 1965, the Commission had reaohed the 
apex of its strength. And While it in Maroh offered this 
favorable agreement on finanoing to the French, France was 
expected to acoept the two "political" elements of immediate 
independent financial resources for the Commission and new 
powers for the European Parliament. The proposal would have 
meant the Commission as of 1967 would have received not only 
proceeds from agricultural levies collected, but the pro­
ceed.s from all industrial tariffs, too, whioh might have 
lStanley Hoffman, 1I0bst1nate or Obsolete? The. Fate 
of the Nation-State and the Case of western Europe,lI Inter­
national Regionalism {Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
19685. pp. 216-217_ 
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lbeen a whoPPing $4 billion a year. 
As de Gaulle said in his september 9 news conference: 
It is true that, according to the authors of the 
draft, this enormous bUdget, which the States would 
supply at the expense of their taxpayers but which 
they would not control, would be sUbject to examina­
tion by the European Assembly. But the intervention 
of this body which is essentially consultative and 
whose members have never, in any country, been 
elected for that purpose, would only aggravate the 
usurpatory character of what was demanded. Be this 
as it may, the combination--premeditated or not--of 
the supranational demands of the Brussels Commission, 
of the support that several delegations declared 
themselves ready to give them and, finally, of the 
fact that some of our partners at the last moment 
went back on what they had previously accepted'2 
forced us to bring the negotiations to a close. 
When France ended the boycott after the elections and 
returned to the Council of Ministers in early 1966, it com­
bined a reasonable style of negotiations with a series of 10 
new demands aimed at cutting down the power of the Commis­
sion. De Gaulle, among other things, wanted the Commission 
to "consult the governments II more closely before making a 
proposal; stop trying to assume executive powers or tasks 
involving "discretion or its own responsibility; II stop try­
ing to act as a state in its relations with non-member coun-
J
tries or international organization. All in all, from de 
Gaulle's point of view it must have appeared intolerable 
1 4Ibid., pp. 248-2 9. 
2De Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1964-1967. p. 96. 
)Lindberg, 2E. £!i., pp. 250-251. 
that this Uapartride, irresponsible word-machine" should 
prove so successful at maximizing the spillover process, at 
appea.ling directly to groups and individuals in the member 
states and at establishing itself as a legitimate European 
political power. His attack on it indicated that "he takes 
these things quite seriously and that he fears the dynamism 
of a system that might outlive him and continue to 'mislead' 
1 
Europe and the French. II 
At any rate, in 1966, the Common 11arket was revived. 
In January, 1966, after the French return, the Council of 
Ministers, meeting in Luxembourg, came to a compromise that 
accepted the French point of view on some things but not on 
others. The Commission retained its right to initiate pr~ 
possls, but was instructed to consult the siX governments 
prior to submitting them to the Council of Ministers and was 
forbidden to disclose their contents publicly until after 
the completion of the procedure of consultation. The two 
bodies were to consult each other regarding any requests by 
third states for closer cooperation with the E.E.C. as well 
as on contacts to be maintained with international organiza­
tions. And the Council waS instructed to increase its con­
trol over the drafting and implementation of the E.E.C. bud­
get. The effett of this was a reduction of the independenoe 
1 Ibid •• pp. 251-252. 
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of action of the Commission and a sucoess for Franoe in the 
1fight against supranationality. 
But Franoe soored less well on another aspeot of 
supranationa11ty. The Six oouldn't reaoh a oompromise on 
the majority vote in the Counoil of Ministers, but the other 
Five agreed that if the Commission proposals would affeot 
very important issues of one or more members, they would do 
their utmost to seek a solution acceptable to all. France 
made a reservation here, that oonsultation among the Six 
2
should oontinue until unanimity was assured. While Franoe 
was the most outspoken on the matter, it is certainly true 
to say that none of the other five members would want to be 
outvoted on a matter of great economio importance, so indeed 
there is a bUilt-in desire to reach unanimity on important 
matters. It amounted to a fleXible interpretation of the 
majority rule. 
In l1ay of 1966, despite disagreement on matters of 
British entry and NATO, the six states reached a new compro­
mise agreement involving mainly the agricultural aspects of 
the union, a pact which it was believed would throw another 
obstaole in front of the British attempt to join the E.E.C. 
Among other things, the agreement states that on July 1, 
lKUlski, ~ Gaulle and the World, p. 223. 
2 4Ibid., p. 22 • 
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1967, the territories of the SiX were to be open to the free 
circulation of all agricultural produots except for wine 
imported from one of them to the other and the products were 
to be sold throughout the market at prices fixed in agree­
ments concluded by the Six. Imports of agricultural pro­
ducts from third countries were to be subject to levies 
which would amount to the difference between the Common 
Market prices and. those actually paid by the importing mem­
ber state. All customs duties on manufactured goods were to 
be totally eliminated on July 1, 1968, and on the same day 
the Common Market would have a uniform tariff applicable to 
limports from all third states.
Indeed on July I, 1968, the customs union among the 
Six was established and a common external tariff introduced. 
But even today arguments oontinue CJfler the agricultural 
policy (most notable recently wine), and some problems have 
developed. Newsweek magazine recently called the Community 
little more than "an amorphous customs union of siX quarrel­
some, nationalistic states with a common agricultural policy 
that has proved an unmitigated disaster. tr The magazine 
pointed out the massive cost of payment of subsidies to 
farmers--espeoially to those in France, which has nearly 
half of the Six-state area's cultivated land--and the con­
1 6Ibid., pp. 225-22 • 
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tinued increase in prices as food surpluses pile up over 
1 
Europe. But on April 22, 1970, the Council of Ministers 
after lengthy debate reached agreement on a common Wine 
policy that removed the last obstacle to again start negotia­
tions toward a possible expansion of the E.E.C. to 10 mem­
bers. First formal negotiations With Britain, Ireland, 
Denmark and Norway were to start in June, 1970, in Brussels. 2 
This was to mark the third British attempt at entry: 
de Gaulle in 1967 in effect had vetoed British entry for ,a 
second time. The current French position was that it would 
not open talks with Britain and other candidates for member­
ship until the whole agricultural package was tied up. At 
this point it appears to be at least close to agreement, 
although on another matter, the relations of the Common 
~~rket members to their former colonies--an issue particu­
larly important in light of Britain and her Commonwealth-­
disputes remain. 
II. VIEll/S OF COMMON MARKET SUCCESS 
Despite the criticisms and the arguments, it should 
not be considered that the Common Market has been a failure 
or that it does not represent an important step in inter­
lllcommon Irlarket: Enough Blah-Blah," Newsweek, LXXIV 
(December IS, 1969), 44. 
2Assoclated Press Dispatch, Des Moines Register, 
April 22, 1970. 
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state cooperation and integration. While de Gaulle had a 
certain idea of political cooperation among the Six--where 
at least they would hold discussions but not give up the 
rights of the states to act in what they perceived as self­
interest--there is little doubt that the Common ¥~rket does 
have important political aspects, one being merely that it 
is not possible for one state to adopt a foreign policy that 
is frankly and bluntly hostile to the others. The implica­
tions of the market amount to a restriction on the policy 
formulations of the others. However, as Miriam Camps has 
said, while the Common f1arket probably is irreversible in the 
sense that it's almost impossible to see the Six re-enacting 
tariffs and other trade barriers, it is not irreversible in 
the sense used by some "Europeans. u That is, there is no 
iron law of "spillover" or irresistible internal dynamic 
that is bound to carry the Six to full economic union and 
1 
beyond that to some form of political union. But the 
durability of the European idea and the Common r~ket is 
impressive, however. The differences with the Frenoh have 
led, a.t times, to near stagnation in the Community, Ilbut the 
Six have shown an ability and a determination to absorb dif­
ferences of View that on any rational calculation should 
1Miriam Camps, European Unification 1n the Sixties 
(New York: McGraw-HilI Book Company, 1966), pp. 210-211. 
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1
have destroyed the Community." 
The Community has gone on, however, and despite prob­
lems. the member states generally have prospered economi­
cally. As early as 1962. Walter Hallstein. president of the 
E.E.C •• was able to say that Great Britain's application for 
membership in the European Community was "in some respects 
the most striking testimonial to success--and to its politi­
2 
cal character--that could have been imagined." 
The Europe of the Six has received other testimonials 
of success. Hans A. Schmitt in 1962 pointed out that ever 
since they refused to participate in the Marshall Plan. the 
U.S.S.R. and her satellites "have paid Western European 
integration	 the compliment of continuous verbal attack--and 
3the considera.bly more substantial tribute of imitation." 
Jerzy Lukaszewski has written that if anything has restored 
th~ West's attraction in Central Europe. it is the E.E.C. 
4 
experiment. 
But as Michael Curtis has pointed out, the European 
lIbid., p. 213. 
2Walter Hallstein, United Europe: Challenge ~ 
Opportuni ty (Cambridge. f'lassadiusetts: Harvard University 
Press. 1962). p. 81. 
JHans A. Schmi tt The Path to European Union (Batont 
Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State-Untverstty Press, 1962), 
p. 242" 
4Jerzy Lukasz ewski, fill/estern Integration and the 
People IS Democra.cies, II Foreign Affairs t XLVI (January, 
1968), 378. 
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Community still is searching for a means to stem the counter­
revolution of nationalism symbolized by President de Gaulle. 
Said Curtis: 
The nature of the European Economic Community and 
the direction in which it should move still remain 
contentious. Philosophically the argument is whether 
European unity should be built around an alliance of 
sovereign states or through common institutions; 
economically, between those champions of a basicallY 
self-sufficient economic unit and those insisting on 
an outward looking trade community; politically, 
between those wanting to keep the Community limited 
and those arguing that British membership is Vital, 
and between those insisting on European independence 
and others urging a closer relationsnip With the 
United states. l 
One idea on the matter has been the suggestion of 
"federalism \a Ie. carte," because of the unlikely oreation of 
a federal state of Europe in the near future and some 
observers' belief that there is little need of continuing 
economic integration With only siX states. The t1~ la carte" 
suggestion, made by Louis Armand of France, the former 
president of Euratom, conceives not of a single European 
community, but a number of them. Thus, ten nations might 
decide they could unite in the area of transportation, per­
haps 25 on a matter such as a common patent law, and perhaps 
some Eastern European states might be drawn in if these were 
olearly defined, non-political areas. If something such as 
this ultimately should occur 1t might well prove that, "by 
lcurtiS, Western European lntegratlon, p. 223. 
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forcing Europeans to face up.to the impracticality of 
instant federalism, de Gaulle has actually contributed sig­
nificantly to the final realization of a broader European 
1
unity." 
II. THE 1967 VETO 
At any rate, on the question of British entry into 
the European Community, Charles de Gaulle remained opposed 
until the British had accomplished "the necessary profound 
economic and political transformation" that would allow them 
to join the Six. 2 In a press conference on May 16, 1967, de 
Gaulle said that the problem of British membership "for our 
part • • • could not be, and moreover has never been, a 
question of a veto." Rather, it simply means knowing if a 
successful outcome "is possible in the framework and the 
conditions of the present Common I1arket, Without bringing 
destructive disorder into it." Even then, as she said she 
was ready to subscribe to the Rome Treaty, IIshe is asking 
exceptional and prolonged delays and, as regards her, that 
basic changes be made in the Treaty I s implementation." And 
the British "make no secret of the fact" that once inside 
In. van B. and J. B. Cleveland, "De Gaulle I s Europe, II 
ltrance Under de Gaulle (New York: The H. W. iYilson Company, 
I967 r. p. 1:61:­
2De Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1964-1967, p. 180. 
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the Community "they would undertake to obtain many revi­
I
sions." 
In truth, said de Gaulle, it seems that lithe change 
in the situation of the British in relation to the SiX, once 
we would be ready by common consent to proceed With it," 
might consist of a choice between three issues: 
Either recognize that ••• their entry into the 
Common Market • • • would amount to necessitatin~ the 
building of an entirely new edifice, scrapping nearly 
all of that which has just been bUilt •••• 
Or, establish, between the Community on the one 
hand, and Britain and some States of the "little ff 
free-trade area on the other, a system of associa­
tion, such as the one provided for in the Treaty of 
Rome and Which could, Without creating an upheaval, 
multiply and facilitate the economic relations 
between the contracting parties. 
Or else lastly, before changing what eXists, wait 
until a certain internal and external evolution, of 
which Great Britain seems alre~dY to be shOWing signs, 
is eventually completed. • • • 
Thus the writing was on the wall. In July, 1967, the 
British government reactivated its application to join the 
Community, but in November of that year, at another press 
conference, the General announced France wouldn't agree to 
aoceptance of negotiations with respect to British entry. 
De Gaulle's action again found anger and discontent 
among those pressing for further integration. Germany's 
Willy Brandt, for instance. in December, 1967 delivered a 
21Ibid., pp. 177-179. Ibid., p. 180. ~ 
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warning of sorts to the French. He noted that Article 5 of 
the Rome Treaty "enjoins every member state to desist from 
any measures that might jeopardize the realization of the 
ends of the treaty.1t The treaty prescribes negotiations to 
this end. Every member is free with respect to the final, 
material decision, "but no one may block the road. that 
according to the treaty leads to a decision concerning the 
1acceptance of new members. 1f 
But even among the staunch supporters of a united 
Europe, there were those who agreed with the de Gaulle con­
tention that Britain had economic difficulties and would 
need a transitional period before becoming a member of the 
Community. Robert Marjolin, a former vice-president of the 
Commission, noted in a March 1, 1969, speech that there were 
three major causes of the disenchantment felt among supporters 
of European unification: That it was difficult to advance 
any further down the road to economic unification because 
"of certain acute difficulties, pa.rticularly with regard to 
financing the common agricultural policyn; that no solution 
had been found to the problem of enlarging the Community; 
that there had been no breakthrough to a political commu­
nity. The common agricultural policy was 1n a state of 
crisis and it was feared the major portion of the Communi­
lWll1y Brandt A Peace Policy for EuroRe (New York: 
Holt, Rineh~t and winston, f969) , p.~. 
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ty'g time in the years ahead would be taken up Qy it. 
Marjolin said the British question was dividing the Commu­
nity and that if Britain didn't become a member of the Euro­
pean club, the prospects of the move toward the political 
1
unity of Europe were Virtually non-existent. 
IV • THE SOAMES AFFAIR 
The gloominess of the "Europeans lt hadn't been eased 
any by a heated controversy that had broken out earlier in 
1969 after a discussion on February 4 between de Gaulle and 
British Ambassador Christopher Soames. The controversy 
centered on Soames' report that General de Gaulle had sug­
gested that the Common Market be replaced by a Wider economic 
and political grouping of Western European nations, indepen­
dent of the United states and the North Atlantic Alliance. 
According to Soames, this new grouping was to have an Inne>r 
directorate of France, Britain, Italy and West Germany, 
relegating other Western European countries to "second-class 
citizenship." The British communicated this version to 
Franoe's partners in the Common Vmrket and immediately, 
after the Soames report was made publio, the French offi­
cially denied the report and declared no four-power director­
ate had been mentioned and that the rest of de GaUlle's 
1"1\1. I'.iBXjolin on the Future Construction of Europe," 
Bulletin of ~ European qommunitles, II (June 1969), 74. 
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statements had been grossly distorted and magnified. The 
French apparently were miffed not only for the "distortion" 
of what the General had to say, but for informing other gov­
ernments of what was supposed to be a confidential conversa-
I
tion. 
But London denied twisting the General's ideas. 
Michael Stewart, British foreign secretary, said: 
Ideas of this kind affect the security and prosperity 
of these five, who are our partners in NATO and the 
Western European Union. We must therefore tell these 
countries--who are our frie~ds and allies--about what 
was proposed by the French. 
The controversy was carried out mostly in the press 
and was the topic of a long debate in the Commission on 
February 26. But a Commission spokesman said that while 
deploring the incident, the Commission did not want to make 
a comment on it. The Bulletin of ~ European Communities 
commented that for the Commission, "these surface eddies, 
however regrettable, did not affect the Common r~ket in its 
depth,lf and that the Commission considered that it "behoved 
the Community authorities to continue the construction of 
3
the common policies lqi thout interrupt ion. If Comments such 
as those by Michel Debre,.; the anti-European French minister 
1News item in the New York Times, February 23. 1969. 
2News item in the New York Times, February 23, 1969. -~ 
3l1Franco-Britlsh ControversY," Bulletin S!f the ~­
pean Communities, II (April, 1969), 90. 
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of foreign affairs, didn't make the integrationists tee1 any 
better, either. In an address 1n April, 1969, Debre( said 
that France was opposed to "hare-brained notions of supra­
nationality" and. that it could only contemplate a politieal 
and economic organization of Europe oriented toward indepan-
Idance of political thought and action. 
V. DE GAULLE RESIGNS 
But before long comments such as those and the 
unpleasantry of the Soames affair took a back seat and Euro-
peen integrationists suddenly felt a surge of encouragement. 
Charles de Gaulle, in late April, 1969, resigned after 
voters had rejected a bill for constitutional reform. The 
General frequently had felt the need to get new proof of 
confidence from the nation, but this time he did not obtain 
it. vfuile the rejection of the referendum may have indi­
cated a disillusionment With certain de Gaulle policies, it 
is doubtful whether the vote could be considered a rejection 
of de Gaulle's nationalistic, anti-integration foreign 
policy, other than in the fact that the French state of 
economic affairs had ties to certain foreign policy prac­
tices. The May, 1968 student and worker rebellion in France 
lllDeclaratton by 1'1. rUche1 Debr{ on supra.~tionall ty, " 
Bulletin of the European Communities, II (June, 1/69). 75• 
...;;".;.;...-..;;;;.:;..;;.=-­
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"showed for the first time a crucial f!all in the solidarity 
of the regime and of the I'resident. 11 Many Frenchmen had 
been unhappy with the state of economic affairs since the 
autumn of 1968. Time and aging may have been other factors 
in the election results, as well as the fact that there was 
a Gaullist successor--Georges Pompidou--waiting in the wings 
I 
for the first time. 
So Charles de Gaulle sUddenly was gone from the Euro­
pean politioal plcture--although it was not so easy to say 
that Gaullism had departed as well. But before assessing 
what the prospects of Western European union might be in the 
absence of de Gaulle, it is necessary to go into a more 
detailed look a.t de Gaulle's views on a range of topics to 
determine fully what effect he had on the matter of European 
integration. 
item in the Ne~ York Times, April 28, 1969.I Newe 
CHAPTER IV 
ASSESSING DE GAULLE 
In analyzing and interpreting de Gaulle's attitudes 
toward Europe and European integration, a first step is 
going back to his war memoirs, written and published during 
the 1950s, which are most instructive. 
I. FRENCH PRIMACY IN WESTERN EUROPE 
He states flatly that he "intended to assure French 
prima.cy in Western Europe. II And how was de Gaulle to do 
that? By: 
• • • preventing the rise of a new Reich that might 
again threaten its safety; to co-operate with East 
and West and, if need be, contract the necessary 
alliances on one side or the other Without ever 
accepting any kind of dependency • • • to persuade 
the states along the Rhine, the Alps, and the 
Pyrenees to form a political, economic, and strategic 
bloc: to establish this organization as one of the 
three world powers, and, should it be necessary. as 
the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-American 
camps. Since 1940, my every word and act had been 
dedicated to establishing these possibilities: now 
that Franoe t'l~S on her feet again, I would try to 
realize them. l 
Some writers have termed the politics of de Gaulle 
2
"inscrutable and ambiguous,lf but this writer would agree 
With the view of Louis J. Halle, who says that by reading de 
IDe Gaulle, Memoirs, pp. 872-873. 
2curtis, western ~uropean Integration, p. 220. 
Gaulle it is hard to see 
the 
how one wouldn't be impressed by
and without conclud':'
ing that there is nothing particularly enigmatic about his 
1 
or his purpose,,"
"monolithic simplicity of the man, 
thinking, his policy, 
In the passage from his Memoirs above, de Gaulle 
candidly states his intention to do what he can to insure 
French primacy in Europe" To do that, France must contain 
Germany, and it will be willing to contract on the "one side 
or the other" to do so, but without ever accepting "any 
dependency." De Gaulle, in his willingness to accept alli­
ances on this "one side or the other," is stating clearly 
that ideologies have little impact on his methods of opera­
tion" As he once mentioned while French president, liThe 
banner of ideology in reality covers only ambitions" And I 
2believe that it ha.s been thus since the world was born,,11 
De Gaulle wanted a Europe, he said in his Memoirs, that can 
stand as powerful as the Communist bloc or the Anglo-
American camp" And by his linking of the British and 
Americans, even in his I'1emoirs, it is hard to see how he 
would be expected to quickly change his view toward Britain. 
He excluded Britain from this inner circle of Europe in his 
Memoirs as he did by his later vetoes" De Ga.ulle often men­
lLouts J Halle "De Gaulle and the Future of 
Europe," The Vi;ginla Qua.rterlZ Review, XLIII (Winter, 
1967). 4-5. 
2De Gaulle, Majpr Addresses, 1958-1964, p. 237" 
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"from the Atlantic to the Urals," 
which effectively would include Eastern Europe but not 
tioned building Europe 
Britain. 
II. BRITAIN. THE UNITED STATES AND DE GAULLE 
Did de Gaulle seek to keep England from enteri~~ his 
sort of Europe because it is an island state far different 
from the continent, or is it that he feared English influ­
ence as a member of the European union that might be formed, 
especially in its acting as a "Trojan horse" for the United 
states? And, indeed, although the London Times has called 
1de Gaulle the "wrecker" of the European unity movement, 
what has been the British attitude? 
Going back to late in World War II, de Gaulle 
received a rebuff to the idea of a British-French alliance. 
The General, referring to a November, 1944 meeting among 
himself, Churchill, and Anthony Eden, said that the peace 
"we French hoped to build in accord with what we regarded as 
logic and justice, the British found it expedient to approach 
2 
With formulas of empiricism and compromise." Churchill 
also "had made for himself a rule to do nothing important 
except in agreement with Roosevelt."J From then on, the 
1Curtis, £E. cit., p. 2J. 
J Ibid., pp. 2)2-2)).2De Gaulle, Memoirs, p. 728. 
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a special meaning: The
British and Americans acting in unison to safeguard their
expression "Anglo-Saxons" assumed 
particular interests at	 the expense of all others--particu­
1larly France and Europe. 
Another incident late in World War II also proved to 
be something de Gaulle undoubtedly did not forget later when 
he was considering Britain in his over-all foreign policy. 
In April and May of 1945. the English supported underground 
activities against France in Libya and Syria. two countries 
then under French mandate. De Gaulle sent in troops to 
restore peace without bloodshed. but this was not what 
Churchill had wanted--tlhe wanted to humiliate France and 
2
then to take its place in Libya and Syria. tl The incident 
undoubtedly remained in de Gaulle's mind and. along With the 
December, 1962. Skybolt affair between }~cmillan and Kennedy, 
reinforced the idea that de Gaulle had of the British. as 
"Machiavellis, cloaked in courtesy and decked out in friend­
3 
llness. f1 
However. while de Gaulle can throw the British and 
United states into the same camp on many occasions, there is 
little doubt that he does have a considerable difference of 
opinion at base in viewing the two countries. De Gaulle at 
lMacridis. ~ Gaulle, Implacable Alll. p. 196. 
2Aron, ~ Explanation .2! Q! Gaulle, pp. 11~4-145. 
3Ib1d ., p. 146. 
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least knew Britain rather well and "the least one may say is 
that he has a deep respect for Britain."l But this is not 
true of the United States, where he never lived and there­
fore probably found easier to distrust. 
In his Memoirs, too, in speaking of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, de Gaulle indicates he felt Roosevelt was dis­
trustful of the French general. From the moment America 
entered the war, Roosevelt was convinced "that France in 
particular should recognize him as its saviour and its 
arbiter." Roosevelt, the General said, "beneath his 
patrician mask of courtesy ••• regarded me without benevo­
lence.,,2 
Roosevelt's conception of the post-war world was an 
imposlng one "although disquieting for Europe and. for France. 
• • • It was a permanent system of intervention that he 
intended to lnstltute by international law." In Roosevelt's 
mind, a four-power directory "would solve the world's prob­
lems." And those four powers did not include France, but 
only the United States, Soviet Union, China and Great 
Britain. "As for the future, he was anything but convinced 
3
of the rebirth and renewal of our regime." 
lKUlskl, ~ Gaulle and ~ World, p. 234. 
2De Gaulle, Memoirs, pp. 392-393. 
3Ibid ., pp. 573-575. 
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I11III>--------- _ 
De Gaulle, however, apparently had better relations 
with Harry Truman. Truman impressed de Gaulle as "equal to 
his task, his character firm, his mind oriented toward the 
practical side of affairs--in short, a man who doubtless 
promised no miracles but who oould be oounted on in a 
crisis.I,1 
While de Gaulle had some unpleasant war-time dealings 
With both British and American leaders, these should be con­
sidered but probably not overweighed in assessing de Gaullels 
policies of later years. Besides, the record has been 
olear, regarding British attitudes toward European unity and 
the Common Market, that Britain had been reluctant to enter 
into any binding relationship with the continental countries. 
Britain, as Prance, did not want to surrender any sovereign 
power, wanted a minimum of centralized machinery, saw the 
free trade area it helped set up in economio terms only and 
did not want negotiations extended past industrial products 
2into the agricultural. Several considerations after the 
war made Britain wary of a federalized Europe. First, the 
special relationship developed between Great Britain and the 
United States during the war years--lndeed, perhaps strength­
ened rather than only developed--depended on an independent 
British diplomaoy. Similarly, it was deemed impossible to 
1Ibid. t p. 911.
 
2Curtls. £E. cit., pp. 23-24.
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Also, 
close arrangements with non-socialist coun­
be both part of the Commonwealth and part of Europe. 
the Labor Party, which headed the government until the fall 
of 1951, feared 
tries "when the main levers of England's economy were being 
brought under state control. tt And finally, as the "European" 
area could be confined only to the free and democratic 
states, there was a reluctance to enter into any formal 
European agreement that would signify the division of Europe 
by excluding the Soviet-controlled states as well as the 
1
totalitarian states of Southern Europe. 
But as the 1950s continued, many things happened that 
affected Britain's view of world events and the Common 
Market idea. There was a general lessening of cold war 
tension, a feeling of loss of British World power as her 
empire shrank, a crisis in the "special relationship" ewer 
Suez, problems in the British economy. The British, 1n 
their new pursuit of E.E.C. entry, seemed to be abandoning 
their claims to be a great power for entry into a group in 
which, they believe, their experience and abilities will 
2
entitle them to a leading role. 
So Britain continues to press toward membership in 
the European Community, the leaders of the movement 
A fewundoubtedly inspired by the departure of de Gaulle. 
ISerfaty. Fran~, B! Gaulle and Europe, p. 55. 
2Mlddleton. The ~s~u.p_r_e_m_e Choice, p. 15· 
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days after the resignation of de Gaulle, British Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson commented that lithe arguments for 
progress toward a unified Europe, the need to go forward 
wi thout more ado, are compelling. II Without naming names, 
Wilson criticized those countries that for the Ifnarrowestll 
1
national interests had blocked progress toward that unity. 
But, as Newsweek magazine has said, public enthusiasm 
in Britain for British entry "has been waning sharply ever 
since General de Gaulle's departure made the prospect 
valid. II The cost in some aspects would come high, it is 
believed, including sharply higher food prices. But the 
Labor government and Conservative opposition still are com­
m1tted to taking Britain into Europe despite growing popular 
disapproval. British entry would gain access to a free 
market of 250 million persons, instead of 50 million at 
home. And on the political front, Britain could aga1n be 
able "to talk to the superpowers on more equal terms, even 
2 
if only as part of a united European voice. II 
George Brown, deputy leader of the British Labor 
Party, conceded recently that there indeed was truth to the 
view that there was an apparent growing British coldness 
toward "Europe." But Brown said he still remained convinced 
lNews item in the New ~ Times, May 6, 1969. 
2"Common Market: Enough Blah-Blah, II Newsweek, LXXIV 
(December 15, 1969), 49. 
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that Britain's "political and economic destiny lies within a 
larger European unit." To understand the questioning moed 
in Britain, one has to understand the situation in which the 
British have been placed. "For almost a decade, Britain has 
declared her willingness to play her full part in building a 
wider European unity.lI It was not the British attitUde 
toward Europe that has changed; rather, it has been lithe 
long time that we have been forced to hang around waiting 
that has exasperated many people," said Brown. But, he said 
in late 1969, with a new government in Germany as well as a 
new French government showing signs of "developing a posi­
t1ve European policy, II the atmosphere in BTitain is improv­
ing. 1 
Deputy Foreign Minister George Thompson adds that 
true, there 1s ooncern in Britain about some of the short­
term economic effects of entry into the Common Market. But 
Brl tain is in a much stronger economic post tion than at the 
time of its earlier approaches to the Common Narket and is 
beating its balance-of-payments problem. The oontinent 
needs Britain. said Thompson. as much as Britain needs the 
2
continent. 
While the British continue to seek entry, the United 
lGeorge Brown, "Why Doubt Britain's Intentions?," 
EllrOpean Community, No. 129 (November-December, 1969), 8. 
2George Thompson, "Britain is ReadY Now, I! Europea.n 
9ommunitl, No. 129 (November-December, 1969), 8. 
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States has continued a policy of support of Western European 
integration as well as support for British entry into 
Europe. What have been some of the reasons for this support, 
for it can be considered that a stronger Western Europe 
might be seen by some Americans as a. strong rival for world 
influence and therefore not to be encouxaged? Camps has 
noted a strong emotional influence in the American support 
for the European Community since the Community idea was 
"bold, imaginative and creative," and it "accorded with what 
most Americans felt in their bones was right, sensible, and 
long overdue. 11 But the main reason contributing to this 
American support in the past and now is that it offers the 
West Germans lithe best framework wi thin which to shape their 
current polioies. II The Federal Republic needed an alterna­
tive to reunification, and the U.S. judged that lIdeepll inte­
gration of the Six offered the best possible available 
answer to the problems posed by a "truncated but dynamic 
1Germany. " 
As noted before, de Gaulle's different attitudes 
toward the two Amerioan war years presidents might seem to 
indicate, as Aron has said, that de Gaulle had no ! Erlori 
attitude toward the United States, knowing that each 
American president--withln I1mits--could put a different 
Ie pM .. pp. 237­~uropean Unifi.oation in the Sixties,am;:,,!.:. _ =~ 
251. 
78 
stamp on his country's policies. l 
However, this argument can be accepted only partially. 
That is not to say that antagonisms toward the United States 
and Britain because of a war-time grudge form the basics for 
his policy--that policy in essence being French power and 
srandeur--but it seems that there has been an excessive 
amount of personal memories and that the relations between 
the Free French and Roosevelt from 1940 to 1944 have not 
2
ceased to influence Franco-American relations. 
But it hasn't been only Roosevelt and the World War 
II era that have influenced de Gaulle's thinking toward the 
United States. Carroll Quigley believes that the differ­
ences that arose between the two countries would have arisen 
despite the flpersonal Ideosyncracies fl of de Gaulle, Roose­
velt, John Foster Dulles and Dean Husk. For France, the 
question of national security always has been much clearer 
than 1n the United states, and the alienation of the two 
states rests as much on the inadequacies of Dulles' policies-­
and the neo-Dullesism of Rusk and Iqndon Johnson--as on Ifthe 
diffioult personality of Charles de Gaulle."J 
lATon, !!l Explanation J?!. ~ Ga.ulle, p. 165. 
2Grosser, Frenoh Foreign Poli~ Under De Gaulle, p. 
124. 
JCarroll Quigley, f1France and the united states 1n 
Lvorld PoIi tics, II Current Histor"y', LTV (r"1srch, 1968), 151­
159. 
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Serfaty argues that anti-Americanism goes far beyond 
de Gaulle himself. It was born in the early days of the 
Fourth Republic~ as a resentment of dependence. And in the 
1950s~ espeoially~ the anti-Amerioanism was aggravated by 
1the inoreasingly liberal U.S. polioy on colonial matters. 
What, however, does all this have to do with de 
Gaulle's attitudes and policies toward Western European 
integration? The relationship 1s important because de 
Gaulle has been wary that inoreased federalism and supra­
nationality in Europe would allow the United states to be 
the hegemon, to dominate Franoe and the other countries at 
the expense of their national interests. The unification 
plan has too often been a oover for non-European interests. 
2 
in other words. De Gaulle's attitudes toward the United 
states also have been important in the story of NATO, Which. 
while not an institution confined to Europe, is another form 
of co-operative or integrated aotivity whioh has run beyond 
a simple military alliance. 
It is helpful, again, to inspect some of the words of 
de Gaulle on this matter and to look more deeply into the 
question of NATO and the American eoonomic challenge to 
Europe. 
In a press conferenoe on July 29, 1963, de Gaulle-­
lSerfaty, ~. ~., p. 1J1. 
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after giving a typical lengthy review of events leading up 
to the question at hand--tells how France came out of World 
War II "greatly weakened in every respect" and that was 
why, with regard to the United states, she found herself in 
a position of dependence: 
France constantly needed its assistance in order 
to avoid military collapse. It was from America that 
she received the weapons for her soldiers. France's 
security was dependent entirely on its protection. 
With regard to the international undertakings in 
which its leaders at that time were taking part, it 
was often with a view to dissolving France in them, 
as if self-renouncement were henceforth its sole 
possibility and even its only ambition, while these 
undertakings in the guise of integration were auto­
matically taking American authority as a postulate. 
This was the case with regard to the project for a 
so-called supranational Europe, in which France as 
such would have disappeared, except to pay and to 
orate; a Europe governed in appearance by anonymous, 
technocratic and stateless committees; in other 
words, a Europe without political reality, with­
out economic drive, Without a capacity for defense, 
and therefore doomed, in the face of the Soviet 
bloc, to being nothing more than a dependent of 
that great Western power, which itself had a 
policy, an economy and a defense--the United States 
of America. 1 
But since then, France's position has ohanged consid­
erably. Her new institutions put her in a position to wish 
and act. Once again, the national and international condi­
tions of France resemble less and less what they used to be. 
Thus, he asks, "How could the terms and condi tiona of her 
2 
relations with the United States fail to be altered thereby?" 
IDe Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1958-1964 , pp. 233-234• 
2Ibid ., p. 234. 
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On April 27, 1965, de Gaulle again stresses the inde­
pendence of France, which has not failed to surprise "but 
even to scandalize oertain oiroles for whioh Frenoh vassal­
age wa.s the habit and the rule. It In strong words directed 
toward the United states, de Gaulle adds that the fact that 
Franoe has reassumed its independent policy has served 
IIsometimes to displease a State which may believe that, by 
virtue of its power, it is invested with supreme and univer­
sal responsibi Iity. 11 But, who knows? Perhaps some day the 
lIadvantage whioh this friendly country may have in finding 
France on her feet will not by far outweigh the annoyance 
1 
i,olhich it now feels about it?" 
It is in this speech where it seems de Gaulle 
unalterably declares the independence of France. 
III. NATO AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
One also can see the independent attitude toward 
European defense develop in de Gaulle's addresses over a 
period of years and as France moves toward development of a 
nuclear "force 1! frapEe. 
" 
On t·mah 25, 1959, in the first 
press conference held by de Gaulle as president of the 
F~ench Republic, he mentions the East-West conflict and says 
that Franoe, Without the weaponry of the Amerioans and 
IDe Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1964-1967, pp. 88-89. 
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Russians, might try to keep out of the conflict and--if it 
came to that--the war. But de Gaulle rejects that policy, 
which would amount to France--in an attempt to keep her 
life--giving up her reasons for living. And this also would 
be lito destroy the Atlantic Alliance, an alliance which is 
unimaginable Without the participation of France." Thus, 
"we prefer to maintain the Alliance until the day when the 
future of peace is assured. II While thus stating the need 
for the Alliance, de Gaulle in the same press conference 
tells his audience that he is suspect of an integration in 
which "peoples and governments find themselves more or less 
deprived of their roles and responsibilities in the domain 
of their own defense," and that the Alliance will be "all 
the more vital and strong as the great powers unite on the 
1basis of a cooperation in which each carries his own load." 
On November 10, 1959, de Gaulle was asked at a press 
conference to comment on the United Nations debate about the 
proposed French nuclear tests in the Sahara. He gives here 
his first clear statement that France was alming at devel­
oping a nuclear force of its own, no matter what the opinion 
of its NATO allies or the United Nations. The "Anglo­
Saxons II and the SOViet Union for years have been testing. 
manufaoturing and inventing Itcolossal nuclear armaments, 11 
IDe Gaulle. Major Addresses, 1958-1964, p. 49. 
,~t:~·'f--------------
8) 
and the Un1ted Nations never has condemned "this dreadful 
cosmic threat," nor invited the two sides to destroy the 
weapons or cease manufacturing them. If the two sides want 
to stop testing, France can only approve. But if anybody 
wanted to ask France to renounce atomic weapons for herself, 
"while others are in possession of them and are developing 
them in tremendous quantities, there is not the slightest 
1
chance that she would accede to such a request." 
On May Jl, 1960, after the failure of the summit con­
ference, de Gaulle repeated the two themes. France intends 
to remain an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance, but 
France must have her own role and her own personality. This 
implies that she must also acquire a nuclear armament, that 
she must be "sole mistress of her resources and her terri­
tory; in short, that her destiny, although associated with 
2
that of her allies, must remain in her own hands." 
Nearly a year later, on April II, 1961, de Gaulle was 
continuing to argue the need for France to develop a nuclear 
capabllity since "as long as others have the means to 
destroy her, it 1s necessary for her to have the means to 
defend herself. II And on NATO, 110'ttT there 1s a somewhat 
subtle change of tone, where he said he did not question the 
need for the Alliance, but its present organization. citing 
2Ibid., p. 77.lIbide. pp. 60-61. 
-
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1
again the dangers of integration. 
After another year, on May 15, 1962, de Gaulle now is 
questioning whether or not the United States actually would 
defend France with America's nuclear weapons if it came to 
that. The Atlantic Alliance must be maintained as long as 
the Soviet Union threatens the world, but it must be 
realized that conditions are greatly changed from when the 
organization Was set up 12 years previously. No one could 
now tell how either the United states or Soviet Union would 
employ its nuclear arsenal. It is enough to say this, in 
order to understand that "as regards the defense of France, 
the battle of Europe and even a world war as they were ima­
gined When NATO was born, everything is now in question. II 2 
By July 2], 1964, General de Gaulle was able to say 
that France's nuclear program was moving along nicely and 
now it not only constituted for her !lthe incomparable guar­
antee of her security, but also introduces into a dangerous 
world a new and powerful element of wisdom and circumspec­
tion. l ) 
The next spring, on April 27, 1965, de Gaulle, in an 
obvious reply to critics Who said the French nuclear program 
that the Frenoh defense oostswas costing too much, c I aims 
21 Ibid., pp. 179-180.Ibid., pp. 123-124. ~ 
JDe Gaulle, Major Addresses, 1964-1967, p. 25. 
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are "no more than those which we would have to furnish for 
Atlantic integration, without thereby being sure of protec­
tion, if we were to continue to belong to it as subordinate 
1
auxiliaries. II 
On October 28, 1966, asked whether France intended to 
leave the Atlantic Alliance, de Gaulle did not answer the 
question directly, but said at that point in time "there 
remains for us no subordination, either actual or eventual 
of our forces to a foreign authority, II and in five months, 
"no general staff, no unit, no base of any allied army will 
remain on our soil. II In add! tion, France was building its 
nuclear force and giving back to 1ts own forces "their fully 
nat tonal character in the way of command, operation and 
training. II Now, flit is hard to see how the country is being 
ruined by this, since, 1n relation to its total budget, it 
113 spending no more than it spent in the past. II Besides, 
there are me.ny signs of what a healthy impression 113 being 
produced by Prance's reappearance in the ranks of the 
pm-lers. For a world 131 tuation 1n which two superpowers 
would alone have the weapons capable of annihilating every 
other country "over the long run, could only paralyze and 
sterilize the rest of the world. It Under these conditions, 
how could Europe unite?2 
De Gaulle t s independent atti tude tmvard NATO antago­
86 
nized his American allies, for from the American point of 
view, the French resdurces would have been better spent on 
conventional forces rather than nuclear arms. But, noted 
Henry Kissinger, from the perspective of vindicating 
France's identity, de Gaulle was not so concerned with the 
technical aspects of strategy as with the political problem 
of choice. Wrote Kissinger: 
The United States considers central control over 
nuclear weapons crucial for the contingency of 
general war: De Gaulle gives priority to France's 
impact on the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy. 
Secretary McNamara strives for strategic options; 
President de Gaulle seeks political ones. l 
Despite the independent role adopted by France 
, 
vis-~-vis NATO and an almost complete Withdrawal from the 
military aspects of the pact, it can be said that France at 
this point in time is working much closer in military 
matters with other NATO states than it had been; in fact, 
the closer relationship had been developed a year and a half 
before de Gaulle resigned. The invasion of Czechoslovakia 
by the Soviet Union caused de Gaulle to rethink his views of 
East-West relationships and smashed his plans for East-West 
agreement. 2 In covert form, the closer working relationship 
of France and NATO followed in the military sphere and there 
1s some belief it will be easier for France to return to 
Yorl{ : IHenry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New 
54eMCGraW-Hill Book Company,-r965), p. 
~ k T·i es MoY 4, 1969. 
L Net'1S item in the Neti Yor .. ID .. 1 '"'" 
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NATO military co-operation in the absence of de Gaulle. l 
The Czech situation, as the Cuban missile orisis in 
1962, caused de Gaulle to rethink the status of world power 
relationships and the part France could play. The CUban 
affair deeply changed the balance of power in the world in 
the eyes of de Gaulle. For de Gaulle, the Soviet Union had 
acknowledged the superiority of the United States, and 
therefore there was no longer any military danger in Europe; 
consequently, one could loosen the Atlantic ties and 
2
approach the U.S.S.R. This dangerous confrontation of the 
two nuclear superpowers strangely enough resulted in a 
lessening of the fear of East-West hostilities and brought 
up more acutely the necessity of NATO. As the 1960s prog­
ressed and Western leaders including Lyndon Johnson as well 
as de Gaulle talked of "bUilding bridges fl to the East, the 
complex climate helped to break down the inner oohesion that 
had been NATO's mark when first forged around a single main 
issue. But the Czechoslovakian incident seemingly has acted 
to breathe new life into NATO while at the same time darken­
ing the possibilities of East-West collaboration. No matter 
Whether de Gaulle or someone else 1s at the helm in Franoe, 
however, the problem of the control of nuclear weapons 
item in the Ne~ York Times, April 29, 1969.I Newe
 
2Grosser, Frencq Foreign Policy Under De Gaulle, p.
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remains. While co-operation indeed may be enhanced in NATO 
f 
the question of integration here--with some sort of inter­
national control of the nuclear trigger--ls doubtful anytime 
in the near future. 
IV • DE GAULLE AND GERMANY 
Going back to the days before the de Gaulle presi­
dency and to the development of NATO and the European commu­
nities, in both cases it can be said that one of the key 
issues has been the control of Germany rather than only fear 
of the Soviet Union or the need of economic gains. For 
instance, in February, 1948 Georges Bidault, the French 
foreign minister, spoke of "the integration of a peaceful 
Germany into aUnt ted Europe, a Europe in which the Germans 
1 
• • • r1111 be able to give up all idea of dominating it." 
Thus, while the new Atlantic community would protect Europe 
from without, the European community would protect it from 
within. The former could balance Soviet imperialism, the 
latter contain German militarism. During the debates before 
the adoption of the North Atlantic Treaty, the French 
National Assembly made it clear that it regarded the pro­
posed treaty as directed against Germany as much as the 
SOViet Union. For the French, the central political func­
lSerfaty f J"ranc~t Q!:. Gaulle ~nd EuroEe f p. 11. 
tion of the alliance was the collective management of 
Germany, and more particularly a collecti!e guarantee 
against a revival of any form of bilateral German-Soviet 
1
relationship. 
France and the other countries of the Six also have 
felt that a reunification of Germany could threaten European 
peace, and it is likely in General de Gaulle's eyes the 
European Communities would not have come into being if 
2 
Germany had not been diVided. But for the Federal Republic 
of Germany, integration had some obvious advantages in the 
early years after the war and its leaders embraced the idea 
warmly. For Germany, integration--both in NATO and a Euro­
pean community--meant a leap from "opprobrium and impotence, 
to respectability and equal rights" (as for the other small 
states in the community it mean exchanging a modest dose of 
autonomy for participation in a potentially rich and strong 
3grouping) • For Germany and the other members of the Six: 
except France, integration meant an almost certain improve­
4­
ment in the national situation. 
I"or Germany, supranationali ty meant at the most 
renouncing the aoquisition of something it did not yet have, 
1Ibid., p. 1.55. 
2flaCridlS, De Gaulle, Implacable AllY. p. 77­
JHoffman. "Obstinate or Obsolete, If pp. 211-212. 
4
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while for France it meant abandoning a sovereignty already 
in its possession. This explains the attitudes of France 
continually being more reserved than that of Germany on the 
matter of political integration. In the same way, the 
status of inequality within NATO is much more unacceptable 
to France, for whom the Big Four once had meaning, than to 
the Federal Republic, which fOUnd the Atlantic Alliance even 
under American domination "an egalitarian paradise compared 
1
with the situation of 1945 and even 1949. 11 
Today Germany has prospered through its relationships 
with the United States and in the various European organs to 
become what has been termed "the economic and political 
2 
strong man of Western Europe." However, as Willy Brandt, 
the current chancellor of Germany has said, "We ourselves 
have dlsBccustomed ourselves to claims of leadership and do 
not wish to be confronted by a choice between Paris, London 
3
and Bonn. II The promotion of the European communities, 
their elaboration, and their extension "must be considered 
4­
as a constant of German policy. If As far as the United 
States is concerned, Ift4e t'lish to bulld our European house 
IGrosser, "France and Germany, II pp. 28-29. 
2News item in the New York Times, May 4, 1969. ~~ 
Pe~n.e ·~.'o.l.. i~~ fOT. Europe, p. 63.J Brand t, A ;;;..;;;...;;;;CL.;;;.V_ .;;;..1...;;.....__v~.... -
Lj, 
Ibid .. p .. 32. 
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together with our neighbors and to settle ourselves in it 
livably. Jl However, "most of us know howcrUctal the role of 
the United states is in ensuring that this house not be 
1 
destroyed by tempests." 
While supporting Western European unification, the 
Federal Republic has not re jected its desire to reunify the 
now spI1 t country. There is Il one single nation, not two. 
And that 1s no new reality, but an old one.1I2 
The German question is the greatest national problem 
of present-day EU1'ope and it is a "commandment of historical 
common sense II to solve the quest10n wi thin the framework of 
a general European peace order in suoh a way that lithe right 
to self-determination 1s satisfied by it just as well as the 
Jleg! tlmate interests of the neighboring states. II But for 
the present the idea of an integrated Europe has been a 
plausible alternative to a reunited or nationalistic 
Germany. As t~1ichael Curtis has said, however, the breakdown 
of progress to political union and the policies of Charles 
de Gaulle 11have lessened the likelihood of a. Germany sub­
merged in a larger entity, a.nd the exa.ltation of nationalism 
in Franoe rosy have an intoxl0.ating effect on 1.ts neighbor. 1,4 
Halle put the situation in a similar way in an artiole pub­
lIbid", p. 78.
 
3Ibid ., p. 215.
 
4curtlS, Western European ]ntegratton • p. 222.
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lished in 1967: 
As of today, the Germans appear not to want to 
return to the kind of world that, though it made them 
momentarily predominant in Europe, led to the general 
wreckage in which they shared. But if de Gaulle suc­
ceeded in restoring it they could not refuse, for 
themselves alone, the independence of action and the 
self-contained means of defense that in such a world 
would, as de Gaulle has said, pertain to every great
nation. l 
De Gaulle, as noted earlier, made a great effort at 
developing a Franco-German accord in the 1963 treaty arrange­
ment drawn up bet'tfeen him and Adenauer, but the Germans 
refused to go along with many aspects of it. In his press 
conference on February 4, 1965, General de Gaulle asserted 
that the German problem ''is, indeed, the European problem." 
He once again gave a lengthy historical discourse, in effect 
blaming Germany for causing World War I ("Already, because 
of the German Empire, the first World War had caused a 
gigantic shock in the west, east, north and south of 
Europe II) ., He also spoke of the "tragedy" of tvorld \4ar II 
which left deep scars. Thus, it was with circumspection and 
even with some uneasiness that publiC opir~on in Western 
Europe sometimes viewed the economic expansion, military 
rebirth and political recovery of the Federal Republic. For 
France nOtAl', the problem of Germany involved three closely 
linked questlons--to see that Germany henceforth becomes a 
lBa1le, "De Gaulle and the Future of Europe, II p. 19. 
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"definite element of progress and peace;" on this condition, 
to help with its reunification, and to make a start "and 
select the framework that would make this possible." De 
Gaulle sharply cr1 tic1zed the policy of the Un!ted States 
and Dulles, who he said believed that the West by strongly 
reinforcing NATO, would make f-1oscow Withdraw and thus 
restore German 's unl ty. But that plan "was only a dream, 
unless someone made war--something which Washington and its 
allies were in no way disposed to do." Such indetermination 
in Germany obviously cannot go on forever. Yet in the same 
breath de Gaulle notes that "doubtless one can imagine 
thil"l.gs continuing as they are for a long time" Without pro­
voking a war. it..nd then he stresses again that what must be 
done will not be done except by the lI understanding and com­
bined action of the peoples who have always been, who are 
and who will remain principally concerned by the fate of the 
1 
German nelghbor--ln short. the European peoples. II 
In effect, de Gaulle was telling the world that the 
German problem had to be solved by Europeans, effectively 
exclUding the United States. He termed as foolish the 
American doctrine that integration of West Germany into NATO 
and a European federal state would lead to reunification of 
the two Germanys. Germany remained Europe IS blaok sheep in 
1 .~t",temen.ts,. and PressDe Gaulle, Major A4dresse~, u ~ ~ 
gonferenoes, ~~rch 11. 19~ij-Ma~ 16, 196Z, pp. 8J-~5. 
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de Gaulle's eyes. She would not be reunited for a long 
time, which, of course, would be in what France saw as its 
self-interest--to keep Germany disunited and at least weaker 
than the strong, dangerous country she certainly would be if 
put back together again. It was almost the same sort of 
attitude as that followed by Cardinal Richelieu in the 
Thirty Years War of more than three centuries ago: For 
reasons of the French state, Germany should be kept dis­
united. And France, in the intervening centuries, had seen 
too many times what a united Germany could do. 
A year later, on February 21, 1966, at another press 
conference, de Gaulle did not even answer directly two 
important questions put to him: whether German unification 
was consistent with French national interests and an inquiry 
regarding West German aocess to nuclear weapons. He came up 
with only a rather vague response to the over-all matters: 
The union of the Six can and must also be one of 
the piers on Which gradually will be built first the 
equilibrium, then the cooperation and then, perhaps, 
one dav the union of all of Europe, which would enable 
our co~tlnent to settle its own problems peacefully, 
particularly that of Germany, including its reunifica­
tion, and to attain, inasmuch as it 1s the main hearth 
of ciVilization, a material and human. devel~pment 
worthy of its resources and its capacities. 
Thus the future of German reunificetion again 1s 
relegated to an uncertain future. 
1Ibid •• pp. 120-121. 
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So while the friendship treaty between Franoe and 
Germany oontinued to eXist, it was obvious there were wide 
differences between the two states on some fundamental 
matters. In Maroh, 1969, shortly before his resignation, de 
Gaulle met in Paris with the then German ohancellor, Kurt 
Kiesinger, and said that the friendship treaty was a good 
instrument for cooperation "provided that one remains faith­
ful to it." It was a reference to the German efforts on 
behalf of the British candidaoy to the Common r~ket, whioh 
had been regarded by the General as "bordering on unfaith­
1fulness toward France." As the 11arch, 1969 meeting ended, 
Couve de ll'iurville, a de Gaulle faithful and then premier, 
said the two governments were in fundamental disagreement on 
the British bid for membership. De Gaulle expressed the 
view that Europe had to choose between maintaining the 
present six-nation community or forming a new, much more 
loosely organized grouping that might include not only 
2 
Bri tain and Scandanavia but also "the Turks and the S"l'11ss." 
All 1n all, as Brandt has said, he has regretted some 
de Gaulle decisions from the point of view of the Western 
community. This holds true for questions of European unifi­
cation, of the Atlantic partnership, and also of NATO and of 
nuc lear defense.. liThe seouri ty of Western Europe is indlvisl­
1 . . y 1 ir"mes Harch 15, 1969.Ne1fJ'S 1 tem in the New or!~ ,L. ., 
?
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ble. "It rests ultimately on the trustworthiness of the 
1American commitment." 
v . THE ANERICAN CHALLEN:rE 
But the American role regarding the defense of Europe 
is only one of the major questions involving the relation­
ship of Europe to the United states. A key factor today--so 
clearly pointed out in 3.-J. Servan-Schreiberlg The American 
Challenge--is the economic dependence. or independence, of 
Europe in relation to the power of American business and 
industry. The American challenge is not basically industrial 
or financial but is. above all. "a challenge to .2!!!: intel­
lectual creativ-itl and our ability 12 ~ ideas into 
;eractice. ,,2 It is a matter of organizing production rela­
tions and social relations so that Europeans may fulfill the 
potential of their abilities. It is above all a political 
problem. 3 Neither Europe nor France can escape American 
"coloniallzatlon" until the present polltical structure is 
replaced by a European federat ion. tlUnanimlty is ! formula 
1 f r "'ctlon To want 
.f or negation. majori ty rule a f ormu a 0 a. -. 
ity rule is to seekthe Common Market without accept ing rna j or 
York: 
lBrandt, A Peace Poliel.f2! Euro;ee, p. 4-5. 
2· 1 rihallenge
. J" J" ." S····· hre·lber· The ...Am~e;;:::r:..::·· :;.;c:.;;;;8;.;;;;n v ., . -
.... • ::>erv8n­ C . t _ 
Atheneum. 1968), p. 101. 
(Nev.r 
3Ibid. t
--....... 
'0.
,,., 
203. 
---------
97 
a utopian society where there 1s no authority .111 
To build a powerful and independent Europe means 
strengthening the economic and polltical bonds of the Common 
Market, Servan-Schrelber says. No single nation is strong 
enough to support efficient production in all areas of 
advanced technology, for tithe natlonal framew(Jrk is too 
narrow and cannot provide adequate markets for such pro­
ducts. " The Common Market for years has "avoided fundamen­
tal problems that demand difficult choices and bold solu­
tions. Foremost among these problems is an industrial 
2policy for Europe." Britaln would be the best possible 
ally for France within the Common Market because Britain 
concentrates her efforts on electronics, electrical equip­
ment, 11uclear energy and aViatlon--the various areas that 
the European Community should be developing. Britain could 
help endow Europe tl11. th a world role nand save her from 
3becoming an overgrown SWitzerland. 11 
Resurrecting the Vision of a united Europe in this 
way could have a powerful impact on French politics, claims 
Servan-Schreiber. A federated Europe must be more than a 
mere footnote in party platforms. "Wh.ile students allover 
the Continent are protesting a~ainst the old order, Europe 
1 2Ib1d ., pp. 154- 157.Ibid., pp. 174-175. 
-
3Ib1d .. p. I • 
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is becoming the natural scene of the new Renaissance."l 
Servan-Schreiber's ideas are forceful and obtained a 
tremendously wide reading throughout France and Europe. But 
some of the essential ideas of the work had been voiced 
earlier. For example, in 1966 Gaston Defferre, the Socialist 
candidate for French president in 1964-65, claimed that the 
de Gaulle policy, under an appearance of independence, was 
leading to the colonializatlon of the French economy by the 
United states. He said: 
The formula for resistance is to make a realt ty 
of Europe, an independent Europe. Only when Europe 
is economically and politically united, endowed with 
a supranational authority and a parliament elected 
by universal suffrage--in other words, the exact 
opposite of what General de Gaulle wants--will it 
be capable of confronting the dangers of economic 
colonialization by the United States. 2 
Three decades earlier, Count Richard de Coudenhove­
Kalergi had said that he believed European economic indepen­
dence was threatened by the competition of American pro­
ducers and businessmen. Thus, in order to safeguard conti­
nental independence from America, Europe must unite. Cus­
toms barriers must be abolished, and economic national 
regions must be fused into a lipan_European" region which 
"alone would be successfullY able to keep pace with American 
I Th --. 1rlt of lray (New Yorlt: 
-- J .-J. Servan-Scbrelber, -.!!. bP -- - - .;.!:;;.;&. 
MCGraW-Hill Book Company, 1969), pp. 50-51. 
r, 1 dAfter. n ForeignCOast on De ff erre , IIDe Gaul e an . ---­
A.ffalrs, XLIV (April, 1966), 441-442. 
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industry. If 
Even American politicians and diplomats have said 
essentially the same thing. Nicholas Katzenbachr then U.S. 
under secretary of state r noted in 1968 that if the techno­
logical gap between Europe and the United States is to be 
closed, "Europe must coordinate and pool its creative ener­
2gles more effectively. n George Ball, another former 
American under secretary of state, has noted that "unless 
Europeans move decisively toward some form of political 
union, II it l..Tas highly doubtful that European business would 
"change its babits of thought and aotton enough to m0dernize 
3 
its structure. II Gaston Thorn, Luxembourg minister of 
foreign affairs, said, "Technology will only be able to make 
progress in Europe on a Community basis, and it will there­
4fore need to be organized. jointly. If Brandt adds that with 
the inclusion of Great Britain in the E.G.C., Europe would 
IB.lChard de Coudenhove-Kalergi, quoted in Hans F. 
Sennholz, HoW' Can Europe Survive? (New York: D. Van Nostrand 
Company, Inc:,1955', pp. b5-bb. 
2 
Nloholas Katzenbaoh, ItChallenges of Our Changi~ 
Atlantio Partnership, II Deertment .9.f. sta.te Bulletin, LillI! 
(February 5, 1968), 170. 
3George t>l. Ball, "3~ Super Powers," ~, LXIV
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be in a better position to maintain itself Vis-A-vis the 
1 ----~---.-
technology of the superpowers. For Brandt, the division of 
Western Europe into two economic groupi~~s--of the ~ 
"0 ~.E.C. 
and the E.F.T.A.--must not be allowed to continue. Europe's 
stance in the world would be sUbstantially stronger if the 
communi ty were expanded-- Unot only economically and techno­
logically but politically as well. II 2 
VI • APPEALS FOR UNITY 
Thus the pleas for European unity continue despite 
the setbacks, and--at least for some--the emotional appeal 
remains. A good example of this was expressed by Jean Ray 
in a speech to the European Parliament at Strasbourg on 
I-lay 15, 1968: 
How beautiful Europe would be if it were united-­
if our old continent, laid wa.ste down the centuries 
by so many conflicts, and having unleashed the last 
hiO world wars on its own soil in the cla.sh of Euro­
pean natl01Lalisms, were capa.ble of rising above past 
divisions and outworn r~tionalisms and of building a 
society looking toward human freedom, reconciliation 
between peoples and social progress! 
This was the idea which, nearly twenty years ago, 
inspired the founders of the European Community. It 
is still our ideal today, but have our Member states 
forgotten it? Can they not see that the venture of 
unifying this old and ravaged continent is the 
greatest political work they have accomplished since 
the Second ~1orld t<far tone \'lh1ch earns them the 
1Brandt, OJ? oit .. pp. 52-53. 
2 I"' . 1 
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respect of the entire world and to which they should 
first and forem£st devote their intelligence and 
their energies? 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, still active in the European 
unity movement as president of the Pan-European Union, 
launched an appeal in 11arch of 1969--just after the contro­
versial Soames affair and prior to the de Gaulle reslgna­
tion--that called for a Franco-British entente, the entry of 
Britain into the continental sYstem, a transformation of 
NATO to replace the American hegemony by a balance between 
America and a united Europe. All this is needed to trans­
form Europe into a "fourth power, II along with the United 
states, U.S.S.R. and China, IIfree and peaceful, prosperous 
2
and happy. II 
During the same month, on March 23, 1969, Fope Paul 
VI also made an appeal for European unity. i-lhile it "does 
not behove us to judge or intervene in this matter, II it is a 
duty for all "and for Us in particular, fl to create a new 
moral atmosphere which can facilitate the solution desired. 
Thi s means that "this cannot be the mental!ty of disoord, 
3hegemony and nationalist egoism. n 
1 Jean Ray "The Commission Proposes a Fresh SP~ to 
Action in 'fhree' Communi ty Sectors, ff Bulletin E!. ~ ;;;,!.S'Ur 0.;..op_e_8_n 
.9ol1llTIUnltl,es, I (June, 1968), 12. 
2 ., U i • "Bulletin of 
. IIAn 14.ppeal From the Pan-r..uropean .non, . ­.t.~ Europet:;tn- COIDmUl'1ities, II (April, 1969), 91. 
J T' 1ty " Bulletin of 
/I Appeal by .Peul VI for European. un.· ,. ... ­
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And on April 28, 1969, just as de Gaulle was removing 
himself from the French presidency, the governments of Italy 
and Great Britain adopted a declaration strongly supporting 
European unification efforts after a London conference. 
Britain and Italy agreed that the economic and political 
integration of Europe both are essential and that, "as expe­
rience has shown, neither can go forward Without the other." 
The European Communi ties "remain the basis for European 
uni ty. If The treaties establishing these communities provide 
for the accession of other European countries. If the Commu­
nities are to develop, they must be enlarged, since the 
enlargement of the Communities "would not alter their 
nature, but rather ensure their fulfillment." The two gov­
ernments stated that the political development of Europe 
reqUires that all member countries of an enlarged community 
shall be able to play a full part. Europe must be firmly 
based on democratic institutions, and the Communities should 
be sustained by an elected parliament, as provided for in 
the Treaty of Rome. I1The role of the present European 
assemblies must be enhanced, II and Europe must 1I1ncreasingly 
develop a foreign policy so that she can act with growing 
1 
effectiveness 1n international affairs .. If 
Despite all these pleas, made either emotionally from 
1 E· . e If Bulletin ofAnglo-Italian Deolaration on . urop •. _74" ­~~ l~uropean Communitle!. II (June. 1969). 7J 
-

----------
103 
the heart or on a harder pragmatic basis, the truth probably 
Is, however, that at this time European union is not a 
necessity but a matter of choice for the governments and 
peoples involved. While it probably is the best road to the 
kind of society and role in the world the key Western Euro­
pean countries seem to want, it is difficUlt to make a con­
vincing case that either their economic prosperity or their 
political freedom depend on it. Thus it is not surprising 
that the enthusiasm and emotionalism that characterized the 
European movement in the early post-World trlar II years 
1largely has disappeared. But if the integration movement 
idea does not enflame millions as communism or nationalism 
have done, it has attracted increasing support by the suc­
cess in movements toward that direction. says Curtis: It'rhe 
standardization of European beer bottles is hardly a revolu­
tlonary cause. but in a consumption-conscious economy, 
tangible results may have a greater impact than ideological 
2
convlc t ions. fl 
VII. POLITICAL PM1TIES, UNIFICATION ~\~ ~~TIONALlSM 
The movement toward integration in Euxope was created 
by intelleotuals and political elites rather than by mass 
p. 21].lCamp8, Europea.l) U111fl.catlo.,!! 1£ the Sixties, 
:~ Curti [;, l-!esternEuropelul Integration. p. 8. 
1041 
demand. Among the most unanimous a.nd consistent advoca.te 
of European unity has been the European-wide association of 
Christian-Democratic parties. Socialists, too, have had 
their European-wide association dedicated to promote a 
2United Europe. 
In France, the parties which have had the most con­
sistent record of supporting Europeanism have been baSically 
the socialists and the M.R.1'. (l1ouvement Re'PUblicain 
populaire) plus certain groups in other parties. The ohief 
French anti-European party has been the Communist Party, not 
surprisingly, while groups of varying importanoe Within the 
other parties have opposed integration, particularly the 
Gaullist Party or the U.N.R.--Union ;eour l! ~louvelle 
3
a(publlque. But while there are differences among the 
parties and wi thin them, too, on matters such as integra­
tlon--and this includes the Gaulllsts--lt remains true, how­
ever, tr~t hi storiesl, political ar..d cultural considerations 
narroW' the gap that separate them on the role and future of 
4Prance. It has been common to speak of na.tionalism in 
IIb1d ..
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reference to the France of the past few years B t La. 
·u wrence 
scheinman says that nationalism always was present in post­
war France, and the Resistance particularly bred an intense 
patriotism. This is an argument that carries weight to say 
that only the form and intensity of French nationalism were 
changed by de Gaulle I s return to power, not the very fact of 
I 
nationalism itself. Scheinman carries his analysis further, 
and it is an interesting one to contemplate: 
Thus Gaullists and anti-Gaullists, nationalists 
and self-proclaimed antinationalists. starting from 
different assumptions about the limits of the present 
and the promise of the future, speaking different 
languages and working in different styles. meet at 
the critical juncture of the sense of French destiny, 
mission and leadership, of a great force and status. 
For de Gaulle these goals could be achieved only by 
avoiding the merger of France in a larger enterprise, 
by maintaining independence of action, and by holding 
fast to the principle of sovereignty. For the opposi­
tion this Is the age of the passing of traditional 
sovereignty. It 1s only through a unification that 
entails something more than purely intergovernmental 
relationships that France's future and status can be 
assured; sovereignty is not the highest value, and 
the principle of supranationalism is an acceptable 
starti Doint. De Gaulle and his opposition share 
similar ~oals, seek similar objectives, and envision 
the futur:e of BTance as a France of grandeur. But 
the Gauillst identifies status and power with a par­
ticular form of poli tical organizat ion, the natlon­
state; While for-the opposition the parameters of 
status and power, prestige and independence, and 
the answer to the question of the uses to which 
power, once recovered, should be put?remain less 
choate and only vaguely articulated.­
French nationalists, ~enerally including the 
6.­
i 
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Gaulllsts. thus have regarded deep European unification as 
something of an idle dream. but instead supported a sort of 
unity 1n the sense that the co-operation would be bUilt on 
responsible national governments and parliaments and the 
reality would come out of this political content. The Euro­
peanists have consisted of minimalist and maXimalist sec­
tions. The minimalists--mostly Socialists and a few Radi­
cals--were willing. under certain Conditions. to go beyond 
national sovereignty as needs and circumstances required. 
but generally stopped short of total endorsement of European 
union. The maximalists--essentia1ly Christian Democrats-­
included those who placed emphasis first and foremost on the 
goal of European integration. Jlhowever obtained and in what­
1 
ever form. n 
During the Whole of the Fourth Republic there never 
was a European major! ty among French political parties, ani 
the approval of participation in the Coal and Steel Commu­
ni ty "had been due to an ad hoc alliance between minimalists 
2 
and maximalists, II with Germany the common denominator. 
Throu.ghout the 1950s, the Gaullists opposed various 
measures of European unification for two reasons. First, 
they to.Iented E:uropean unt ty as "au act of self-dtfferentia.­
1 . . .. d '.i"uro~e op. 51- 52. Serfaty, F'rance, De Gaulle an D .' ~ 
+6 
2~b·id . 1'11. ..•• p. ol. 
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tion from the United States, II where the maximalists of the 
Fourth Republic often regarded the European community as 
part of a constantly evolving Atlantic community. Second, 
they attacked a European union that would be constructed as 
a technocracy along supranational lines. l While hostile by 
the end of 1957, the Gaullists nevertheless joined the con­
sensus in favor of European unity in the matter of the 
E.E.C., primarily based on the possibility of immediate 
eoonomic goa.ls. There was thus a distinction drawn between 
2the politics and economics of European integration. 
In essence, what the record has shown, is that the 
Pifth Republic hasn't been as anti-European or anti-American 
as Americans sometimes have tended to believe; nor had the 
Fourth Republic been as satisfied and satisfying a NATO 
ally. as uncondi tlonally in favor of European integration, 
3 
as Americans sometimes remember. The rejection of the 
European Defense Co~munitY 1s one example of that. Opinion 
polls throU-~hout the presidency of de Gaulle have indicated 
that a rna j or i ty of Frenchmen agreed with him except when he 
4 
seemed to threaten the very existence of the Common r~rket. 
So on this whole matter of nationalism. flIaurice Duverger 
2 Ibid., p. 135·
-
Frenoh3Stanley Hoffman in the Pl;"efaoe to Grosser, 
EOrelgl1 Policy lJnder ~ Gaulle, pp. vii-viii. 
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argues that despite some apparent appearanoes to 
the 001'1­
trary, France 1s not more nationalistic than the United 
states or Great Britain. He further argues that there is no 
difference in the intensity of nationalism between France 
and the other nations of Western Europe. l This development 
of French nationalism of the 1960s came more from world 
developments than from the personality of General de Gaulle, 
and the independenoe of French diplomacy was asserted after 
1962--\'1ith the end of the Algerian war--and not when de 
2Gaulle returned to power.
Perhaps, as I'lacridis put it, 1t 1s a moot point 
whether de Gaulle's nationalism is different from American 
or Russian nationalism, "unless we were willing to argue 
that big nationalisms are better than smaller ones and that 
3small bombs are more dangerous than big ones. II Kissinger 
gives this Vlevl of U.S. attitudes toward French nationalism-­
in the emerging areas. the nation-state was treated as 
natural and in Ea.stern Europe great hope was placed in 
nationalism laS a counterwei~ht to Communism. "But in 
{"estern Europe, where the concept of nationalism had origi­
nated, American policy decreed the nation-state as outdated 
and be.cln>Tsrd, II and thus here carne part of the U.S.-French 
1 'f to RoY C. Macrldlsfl1aurioe Duverger in the Pre(, aceYork"' "Harper and Row (ad. ), :0..£ Gaulle, Implacable Al!l New . 
PUbliShers, i96b), p. xxv • 
., 
·-Jbi!,! •• pp. x:lL'ifii. 
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conflict. 
It has become an increasingly common theme of analysts 
of French politics during the late 1960s that the departure 
of de Gaulle would not entail dramatic reversals or radical 
departures in French foreign policy. It probably is true 
that it 1s likely that the Gaul11sts as a group are more 
integration-minded than General de Gau1le. 2 But a quick 
jump to a European federation or to British Common r'1arket 
entry or other major significant changes will not come over­
night, sans de Gaulle or not. 
VIII. INTERPRETING THE DE GAULLE STYLE 
How then can one assess the policies of de Gaulle, 
who had lDBJ1.aged to arouse such emotions it was f/increasingly 
difficult to form a satisfactory dispassionate assessment 'l 
3of his basic policles. This assessment of the difficulty 
of analysis due to emotions was made in 1968, but even a 
year after de Gaulle's resignation, the same problem 
presents itself. ~~crldls noted in 1966 that de Gaulle and 
his policies flhave long been an annoyance and an enigma to 
American leaders and political oommentators. 1I The usual 
lKissil1cM;er, The Troubled Partnership, p. 37. 
2 FI'anoe, lip • 
. Schetnman, IINatlonalism 1n Contemporary 
837. 
istenoe, G8ullist Style," P'
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argument was that de Gaulle "is a nationalist: he has failed 
to act as a 'faithful allyl; he has balked at European unity 
and has by his acts and gestures weakened NATO. fll 
Almost every interpretation of the de Gaulle style 
starts from the assumption that the nation-state is the 
ultimate reality for de Gaulle, that only the nation-state 
can be the basis for political action. that nationalism is 
the strongest of political emotions. Going beyond that, a 
second and interrelated premise is de Gaulle's preoccupation 
vlith the grandeur and strength of France and its ability to 
play an important, independent role in politics. Thus his 
atti tude to ifJestern European problems revolves around a 
nuclear deterrent for France, a protectionist agricultural 
policy and a European com-munity not supranational but which 
2 
can act as an importa.nt force in world affairs. Friedlaender 
and Focke saw de Gaulle's policies as great power policies 
"carried out with all the weapons of the past. II They c1 ted 
his call for a three-power directorate in NATO; independent 
nuclear power as a foroe ~ fraQEe; the attempt nto remove 
the greatest possible forces from NATOli; the exclusion of 
Brl tain from the Common Harket, and the "courting of the 
IMacridls, 2E- cit., p. xii. 
2 r·nte·O'rati.o.n, pp. 220-221­~Gurtis f Hester!! EUl"o12een '::~::;JjD __••;';;.........
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'great	 power' of Germany. II 
Some critics considered the de Gaulle policy 
anachronistic mainly because of the General's faith in the 
nation-state which they considered to be obsolete. Hoffman 
adds that those who pointed out that de Gaulle's Concern for 
the good of France apparently ruled out the good of mankind 
or of broader communities "still have to demonstrate that 
the latter would have been better served by another policy, 
and can in practice be separated from the good of specific 
nations. U De Gaulle's critics attacked his belief that in 
the present world a natlon of France's size and resources 
could play an important role, and salol in it a grave danger 
since other national leaders, uless prUdent, perhaps, might 
make the same mistake with worse results. n However, at this 
time 1t cannot be said whether the crttics were right or 
wrong. This must wait Huntil the returns are in, until the 
2 
consequences have become clear. n And as of now the ques­
tion of the value or harm of the de Gaulle policy cannot be 
fUlly,	 clearly answered. 
~.Jhile this paper is concerned chiefly with certain 
aspects of de Gaulle's foreign policy, his domestic policies 
obViously had relationship to what de Gaulle could do or did 
,-our pelL'o.c.l"e·.~	 and Friend1·.aend Hone r\!e.nl Against 6 0, 
fI 
£	 er. 
p.	 88. 
? .. ,._ face to Grosser. French
'- Stanley Hoffman in the be .. 
foreign '£plicy' Under de Ge.ull~, pp. ix-X. 
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.do in foreign policy. And 1t was domestic issues which led 
the General to resign from the presidency. While it 1s dif­
ficult to label many men as liberal or conservative (they 
may tend toward the conservative in domestic ma.tters and the 
liberal in the foreign field), it is almost impossible to 
put de Gaulle into a mold. At first glance, most might call 
him largely conservative. In domestic matters this might be 
largely correct. His goal, said Duverger, was to lIa ffirm 
the authority of the state in order to assure public order 
and civic obedience. If His temperament, further, was 
1
author!tarian, and he established tla paternalistic regime." 
De Gaulle favored private initiative and was tlopposed 
to socialist institutions and principles. II His regime 
favored the businessman,. bankers and speculators and was 
"relatively inseYl.sitive to the claims of the salaried groups 
and wage-earners, many of whom have a loW' standard of 
2 
living .. " Yet de Gaulle headed a leftist government in 
1944-46 f and this government nationalized several industrial 
sectors and established e. comprehensive system of social 
seouri ty. Adding to this the fact that de Gaulle IIcontrl­
buted to t destruction of the remnants of the dictatorship 
of Marshal pttaln, II and to the re_establishment of democracy 
li'1aurice Duverger in the }'reface to [\lacridis t Q£
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i n France, "we see why we cannot call hi ...... a 
'" conservative."l 
·0, before World War II broke out dAla
, e Gaulle was one of 
tne few mill tary leaders on the Allied sid.e "Who refused to 
conoe1ve of the coming \'1ar in terms of' the principles and. 
tactics of the past and who laid the basis of a new strat­
egy," ',rhis, of oourse, doesn't mean that because de Gaulle 
was right in the 19308, he also was right 1n the 1960s. But 
in Duverger' 8 view, de Gaulle's policies with regard to 
Algeria, Africa and the underdeveloped countries showed he 
WaS able to understand the future and prepare for it. Was 
de Gaulle--like the young colonel of the 19309--rea11y "a 
modern spirt t conoerned with the advent of the twenty-first 
2oentury rather than with the restoration of the nineteenth?f1 
Gaulle always was more concerned l'J1th 
Europe and his policies reflect that judg­t 
mente In de GlJilulle f s mind the world supremoS'· of France 
, an order that was temporarily 
subverted in the period from the mid-1800s to the middle of 
the present contury tlhy ~ ocmblnflt1on of unfortunate circulll­
stilnoe~ and t 1 u,~,oy of those who directed French 
~ftalrs. II J Franoe could onl~l achieve ita former s;randeur 
OM 1 '..."'t·"'n... e8 were met.G,,,,,, true independence if' oertain c rCUlID7 a. '" 
1 2 xiV xvIbid. t pp. .. ... • 
~ 
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Among these was first the ability of a nation t 
. 0 assure its 
own defense. -This is not to sa.y that de Gaulle felt France 
had to have the military power of the Soviet Union or the 
Uni ted states, but that this defense capability could not be 
allowed to remain outside the national framework or mingled 
with something else. Second, in the nuclear age, this 
defense could be achieved only through the nuclear medium. 
Third, independence must be viewed not only from the perspec­
tive of one f s present enemies but also one f S present friends 
and prospective protagonists. Fourth, independence entails 
monetary policies aimed at insuring financial independence 
which in turn strengthens freedom of politica.l independence; 
hence the French attack on the dollar during recent years. 
And, finally. lndepend ence C ond1tions a whole range of 
French poIi Cj/' with rega.rd to European and Atlantic ques­
tions • Thus de Gaulle's polley was to free Europe from the 
two hegemonies and to assure France a role to pla.y in an 
eventually reunified and independent gurope. It was a 
policy aimll1I; for an independent France in an independent 
12:urope but one in vlhich some c ountrles-... namely Prance- ...ll1 ould 
be more equal than others--namely Germany--in areas such as 
1
nUClear defense. 
· . d··· i~aulle spoke of Europe tthin'S 1s oertaln--When e u 
b.elo~~ed to a differenthe made clear that the United states .~ 
t~ . nee·. " pD.1 r" .. t mporarv 1"T8 '. • 
II Nat i onl111 8m in \."on e~, > 01nman, 
81+1- 134 J • 
115 
world. His Europe is either \1estern Europe or Europe from 
1 
the Atlantic to the Urals. But was de Gaulle a 11European?1t 
Kukski sees the answer as yes and no. The General favored a 
European unity founded on the reconoiliation of all the 
European peoples--his distant vision of lIlBig Europe. 1t And 
at the same time, he has been a partisan of a olose union of 
Western Europe as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. 
This initial Little Europe would first be an arbiter between 
the U. S. and U. S. S.R ., and later a superpower in its own 
right, and "on that distant day the two parts of Europe 
2would discover that they form one fraternal family .11 De 
Gaulle is a "European, It but a conditional one. His Little 
Europe must be economically, militarily and politically an 
independent uni on and should never become a un! t of the 
Atlantic community dominated by the United states; further, 
it must rest on the co-operation of policies of its member 
states w'ithout any trace of supranational institutions. 
"For reasons known only to himself, his two conditions merge 
into one • • • the F'rench veto is the only guaranty of Euro­
3 
pean independence .. II 
Doubts about Germany have been a key reason whY de 
In an inte-Gaulle Was intransigent regarding integration. 
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grated Europe Germany might not only play an important role 
on a level of equality, "but also attempt to dominate the 
whole in a manner inconsistent with French interests. ,,1 But 
more importantly, integration might create a political 
enti ty that would be, at least in the beginning, SO lackingfl 
in a.uthori ty a.nd organization as to be dominated by the 
United states; If and this to de Gaulle would be less European 
than a Europe consisting of nation-states co-operating on 
2the basis of "common interests and affinities. fI 
There is little doubt that the crises that have 
arisen in 'western Europe over integration \'lere in large part 
caused by de Gaulle. He has been accused of having contri­
bated to the disintegration of Europe; and this 1s true, at 
least in regard to style, notably in his 196J veto of the 
British. But at bottom, says Grosser, he has not been able 
to find any "Europeans Ii who can very clearly define just 
what they mean in terms of a more united Europe, particu­
larly tlin regard to defense, to atomic power, to policy 
toward the United States, to supranationality, to the geo­
graphic boundaries of this Europe. II} Kulski offers the 
parallel observation that ,\,(hile the de Gaulle "Grand Design" 
had flet-ts, his Frehch opponents who cleL"l1ored for a suprs­
2 
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national Europe do not escape the same criticism. They, as 
de Gaulle, "never stop to examine the difficulty of defining 
one foreign policy for a federal Europe, If in which five 
states would be status quo powers and the sixth, West 
1Germany, a revisionist power. 
So i'lhether or not a united Europe, according to cer­
tain stated formulas, was really Possible or not, de Gaulle 
was accused of blocking it. Paul Reynaud, the former French 
premier, charged that by "going it alone, fl without allies, 
without Europe and in "deliberately destroying the ancient 
and valued friendship of the United States,lt the General 
threw away his real chance of greatness. If de Gaulle had 
not upset the 't~ork of Robert Schuman, the French foreign 
minister who helped establish both the Coal and Steel Commu­
nlty and the Common t1arket, the General could have become 
the first president of the United states of Europe, Renaud 
2
said. The New York irimes, 111 an editorial Ii few days after 
de Gaulle's resignation in 1969, declared that d.e Gaulle t s 
tragedy, end the world' s. \tis that he failed to use his vast 
talents in the broader interests of a genuine European unity 
3 
and world order, under the rule of law. II 
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While many students of the de Gaulle style have seen 
his downfall perhaps not so much directly caused by his 
foreign policy attitudes and actions, they do at least find 
an indireot link. As Hoffman put it, all the resources 
devoted to foreign affairs--fo1' the nuclear force, for over­
seas aid, for the aocumulation of gOld--were thus diverted 
from productive investments in France, or from IlcarrYing out 
an 'incomes policy,' so as to raise the standard of life of 
1 
the underprivileged. II De Gaulle's foreign policy cured the 
French of their lIugly nationalism of resentment," and he 
raised their self-respect, but it was "ineVitably fragile." 
His domestic opponents stressed the difference between "e. 
heroic stanoe of independence, which they deemed politically 
futile and economically self-defeating, and economic prog­
2 
ress at the cost of sacrifices of soverei.gnty.1l The chief 
offense of Gsullism to the mass of Frenchmen was tithe unend­
ing strirllsency of the government's economic policies. II] The 
l1ay t 1968 oris1s t t:qh1ch perhaps was a portent that de Gaulle 
would not sta.y on much longer t was a cha11er~e not only to 
de Gaulle but to everything he stood for-- Ila oentra1ized 
soc :i.al order, .en almost biological 1nabillty to adapt to 
1 [~-fiul.l.e's· Leg.acy·... to pompidou,1I
. Stanley Hoffman, nDe wQ . lh~2. }Jew HepUbl1~. CL,X! (July 12, 1969), 19. 
2 
-~ •• p. 20. 
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""'ement and change. Jt 'fhe Mamo
'y Y crls1a ended because the 
fear of chaOS overwhelmed the demands f 
or change. But in 
1969, when de Gaulle decided to address hi
mself directly to 
the people in the referendum, the electorat· 
e lDade up 1ts 
11al'lY who voted no were confid1 dmn • ant that de Gaulle would 
win anyway, "but the fact that they were wll11Y1CJ> th 
L'O , is time, 
to say no to him, shot..red that they had grown tired of gov­
2 
ernment by charisma. It 
IX. THE FUTURE OF HfllEGRATION 
With de Ga.ulle gone, will the movement to further 
European integration speed up aga.in, show real change? Some 
writers and periodicals think it Will, and there are several 
factors which indicate French policy may turn--or already 
the real probleIllS of~ prooeeding with the movem-ent remain, 
and the mtt!tudes of the :8ri tlsh and Germans certainly will 
lmve a major impact on the outoome as well as the views of 
and the Atlantio world. II The shape of 
the Fr~nch. After the French elections in 1969, the New 
ito!' lzed that it felt the direotion the neT~ 
Ills t course of oooperation with neighbors 
Ql1d tallies. the res"'·'·'·"""""! on of a sense of responsi.bllity for 
J 
the future ofC:ur 
1 
2 
":} 
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the cabinet of Georges Pompldou sn,.,. t
"'Oges ed "not only a pre-
European policy but a return to a more traditional pro­
1 
;.1estern posture." Pompidou replaced Michel Debre '" asvv .. 
foreign minister with lVIaurice Schumann, lithe most European 
of the Gaullists and the most Gaul1ist of the Europeans. ,,2 
Debr( had been rega.rded as a GaUllist "purist," and had the 
reputation of a fierce nationalist and !lanti-European. n The 
"European tendency in the cabinet also was reinforced by the 
choice of Val/ry Glscard d 'Estaing as minister of eoonomy 
and finance, and Justice Ninister Rene'" Pleven and Agrioul­
ture Minister Jacques Duhamel also are strong advocates of 
3 
European integration. 
While public opinion polls may not be decisive in 
stlltesmen f S decisions. results of some recent surveys in 
France and ;"Testern Europe tend to reinforce the opinion that 
Europeans generally favor continued integration efforts-­
other than in Greet Britain. In November, 1969, a Paris­
l"latch magal: lne poll shOl<7ed 66 per oent of those interviewed 
in F'rance favored a common system of defense and diplomacy 
if a European political orgenization were to be set up, and 
52 per cent favored lttsh admission into the Common 
1 y , Tl e" Tune 29, 1969.Editorlal in the Net*l arK _ m b, '" . 
b ,.,2 ') .. I""''''. "'. No ~ 9· 60 (Decem ar (,t "~'''''''''
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ket ( Only 16 per cent oppo d· B ~mr • se. rlt1sh entry; another 32 
per cent were undecided.) The poll also showed that 1n the 
case of an election of e. president of this European politi­
cal organization, 66 per cent polled would vote for a 
foreign candidate if his views reflected more accurately 
their ot'ln than the French candidate rs. The young are more 
European-minded than their elders. Seventy-seven per cent 
of those )4 and younger would vote for a foreign candidate. 
but only 61 per cent in the 50-64 age group and 45 per cent 
1 
of those over 65. The same magaz ine in March, 1970, 
reported on a much t*lider poll of' residents in the countries 
of the Six and in Great Britain conducted through a number 
of influential newspapers and severa.l polling institutions. 
On the question of Whether they favored the evolution of the 
Common Harket into the formation of a United States of 
Europe. the yes answers ranged from 60 per cent in Belgium 
to 75 per oent in Luxembourg (67 per cent in France) 1n the 
countries of the Six. But only )0 per cent in Britain 
answered fsvorebly. But a. large majority of the British 
felt resigned to the filet that continued European integra­
2tl on Wes irreversible. 
In the int ttal press conference held by Pompidou as 
I is V'otent Qui f
IIPour 1 f ope poll tlque 1es Fr~nca18-19. If 
!1tris- • No. 1072 (November 22, 1969). 
2 ' /, . \ ril~ e II paris-Mate], No.ilLes opeens: Qui a: 1 ~urop I 
1089 (rvl6U"ch 21, 1970), 16, lIB. 
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'I:l't"ench president, he struck a pro E 4~ - uropean attitude as well 
, 
in the sense that he said that he considered that lithe 
first 
t hing to be done 1s to continue bUl1dl'l'lrP the (1 
''0 v0lll1ll.Un1ty of 
t he Six:. II The trans 1t i anal stage, he said must b t 1 f e ermina.ted: 
that is our priority task. n Raymond !ron said he felt 
pompldou "thinks more European than the General; however, 
that dafinitely does not mean he holds a different position 
regarding Britain r sentry. n Pompidou will "protect the con­
tinuityn of French foreign policy, but will slowly move away 
from the sort of poliey pursued by de Gaulle, at least as to 
style. It 1s hard to imagine that Pompldou would call news 
oonferences tWice a. year at ll1hich 1,000 journalists would 
"listen to his medl ions about the world for an hour and a 
half. II em t~i 11 sure not 1m!tate de Gaulle "as the 
2 
no ...or~er1 . .,~"'nt'>G<c ._no""tr·.yv but an able g. overnment. II 
had the baoking of Ii parliamentaryde 
majori ty tile to SUUral'lat 10MI integration (and the 
General exert kin.d of that parties and pressure 
groups d 't ft~c t n1Uch t:Ul,Yi"rBY') f Pompidou or other succes... 
~_'"M''' (c snpp.ort and survivalSOl'S may have to depe for .1. 
"'roUOS which had ties pressure ~ . 
1 
"fTess 
Fl"enoh HepUbl 
(AUgust, 19 ). 
II 
ossnrt 
1 S~} c; ). 1 J (1 " 
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sta.rted to weave a. transnational fabric. fl Should this be 
the oase t the Europe of the Six, "instead of being as close 
as :1 t is now to the traditional model of interstate rela.­
tiona t might move again toward the other ideal-type, that of 
1poll tioal community-bul1dlng" II 
But even if all the political leaders of Western 
Europe struck a non-nationalistic approach, differences in 
the national s1 tuati ons still t'10uld lead to different deftnl 
tiona of' the national interest. In particular, the problem 
of nuclear weapons central and. command in a grouping divided 
between nuclear Uhaves" and "have-nots" may prove to be as 
much of a problem in \.festern Europe community-bu.ilding as 1t 
2
 
"
 
II" J.'~' . .... Il"'b t:1lOt 1 ma.rl, us ••. !. e or Obsolete? II p., :2 
CHAFTER V 
SUNt1ARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The impact of Charles de Gaulle on th H' 
e ~uropean unity 
movement might have to wait some time to be f 11
u .y under_ 
stood; that is. the way the European Communities develop in 
the future or what may grovl out of the present regional 
structure may provide the answer better than any present 
analysis. However, certain points can be re-emphasized that 
po1nt the \vay to at least some understanding of the General's 
impact. 
In summar 1ng this analysis of de Gaulle and the 
integration 111Ovement. several things can be restated. De 
10ns in rega.rd to European integration at each 
step of been colored by his intense reeling of 
national i sm for t French state, all entity to h1m that is a 
combine.tlon of t the mystical. The condition 
of France :1 n t 
the presidenoy were not, inGaulle ola 
e should be. A strong, pot"lerful F1'ance 
unht "r..~ what to him was ade 1e so,,-a: ,"""" 
times he let his emo­M.tural thlni.l;--and in t :s 
-~'~n~10al. It was not thatfrom t 
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de Gaulle felt France could claim as much influence in world 
affairs as the United States or the Soviet Union, but could 
be among the most powerful of the middle powers or even the 
central figure in a Western Europe that could challenge 
either of the two superpowers for world prominence. In 
other words, de Gaulle was able to understand how changing 
tt'1Orld conditions regarding the use of force gave new leeway 
to the middle powers. He was able to pursue a more indepen­
dent course as world conditions developed, and this was what 
France had to do if it were to regain its former grandeur. 
Nowhere woas this more true than in the military or defense 
field. France could not achieve any great degree of glory 
if she had to depend on others for her defense--thus, the de 
Gaulle emphas is on development of an independent French 
nuclear force. He pursued a policy that was willing to take 
rlsks--his challenges to the Common I<1arket \\"ere prime exam­
ples--rather than resign France to vihat he saw as continued 
mediocrity. 
In doi all this, hot'lever, de Gaulle was not acting 
Both he andagainst the grain of current French thought.
 
the OPposl tion in l"rance sought similar goals of a France of
 
g,randeur, but de Gaulle felt the means to reaoh this condi­

So the n~tlonalism oftion could only be the nation-state. 
There wasbv de Gau-11e. ­France t'Hls not a phenomenon t dcreae " 
~-nn~e of r~~nti~~ independence, espe­a stron~ feeling in !OLO_v '-'~ 
l 
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cia1ly from the United States, but as 
events showed, this 
could only go so far. Eventually the French people--or a 
majori ty of them--sald that independence 1s fine, but not at 
the expense of a better standard of living at home. De 
Gaulle I s foreign policy found general acceptance throughout 
France, but not when it came to halting progress in the 
Common I'larket, which most Frenchmen seemed to see as a posi­
tive good, all factors of politics and independence aside. 
And to blame de Gaulle for some of the conflicts between 
France and other 1,1estern states is to overlook the fact that 
these confliots existed before he took over the reins of 
French government. As examples, prior to the de Gaulle 
presidency there already were problems involving defense, 
supranatlorrality, economic policy, the question of Germany. 
So in the de Gaulle style of foreign relations, he 
was qUite t'1illing for co-operation a.mong states, but the 
states had to remain independent in matters vi tal to their 
self-interests. States are the only entities that have the 
power to act, not faceless organizations made up of state­
less teohnocrats that usurp powers that rightfully belong to 
the states. But de Gaulle was able to bend to some extent 
to this basic belief if he tho~l;ht it was in the interest of 
France to do so. In other words, a certain amount of supra-
l east in the economicnationality could be acoepted, at 
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area, if it would be to the benefit of Franee, and de 
Gaulle f s policy ~las to mold the COlIlrllon ~~ket to t...h. 
e benefit 
of his country if he could do so. It 1s ,_ 
.. a..LlUost surprising 
to find thewldespread oPPosition to the de Gaulle policy 
since he was t after all, the chief exeoutive o~ D.. 
~ n-anee and., 
after all. was expected to act in what he felt were the best 
interests of his country. 
As for Europe , it is true that General de Gaulle saw 
something superior in the European CUlture, but foremost in 
his mind was the role of France in this larger European 
entity. Hence the way he interpreted things was that France 
rightly could try to force its will upon the conditions of 
the Common r'iarket f but Franee, too, should be able to resist 
the similar sort of thins that England was attempting to do. 
De Gaulle obably did believe. insofar as future success of 
the Common Iils.rket '{'las concerned, that British entry in 1963 
and 196'7 Hould have harmed the institution that had been 
developed at those points in time. And beyond that. he was 
cOncerned about 1taln acting in the Trojan horse role-­
cou.rseit obvloUS throtlJ1;,~' 
Hsrket only to allow the Americans 
through the .t ish to ge·t "'."" t1~. hter hold on Europe.~ He 
was. be::Hdes. distrustful of ~.-1·t•. Al.n.,·""r ~ 6.n,f the united states. .,. l1. 
them ...•...••.•.in past yelirs ha~ . '" not been to his 
·h his soeeches and 
HiSS . 
·.4t····.. 0... . s...t•. "'t.e rJ was mal!lng major
tM ht the UnJ. e G" 
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mistakes in foreign policy. 
II • CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, these things can be said about de 
Gaulle as well as his Position and role in regard to Euro­
pean integration. He did indeed slow down the integration 
movement, or at least changed the direction of it. But to 
say that is not to make a judgment on whether what he did 
was harmful or valuable insofar as the future well-being of 
the states of \'lestern Europe 1s concerned. There were posi­
tive aspects of de Gaulle I s actions as well as negative 
ones. In some of his actions, he was in effect saying to 
the other countries of Western Europe, "Slow down, you 
aren r t sure where you're going." He was able to reveal the 
holes in the thinking of some of the "Europeans," to make 
the promoters of European unity rethink what it was they 
t<lanted and how they could go about reaching a lasting union. 
Other heads of state 1n the Europe of the Six spoke in favor 
of European unity, but they seemed to be unwilling to work 
for independence from the United states. By forcing Europe 
to face up to the impracticality of what has been termed 
"instant federalism," de Gaulle may have contributed to a 
later realization of a broader unt ty. By such Gaullist 
Policies and also by attempts at rapprochement t'11th the 
f',,,,,. en"'r"", I' ",,I,s, 0 se-ed to shatter the
,Communist world, the~  v aa J.' 
•
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image of unity among the Western tr1mper1all t n 
s s, thus reduc­
ing the threat felt in the Communist world. 
As things stand now, the future nature of Western 
European union rema.ins controversial although earl i 
' y mpres­
sions are that the present French leadersh1p will not be as 
forceful as de Gaulle in fighting against schemes of supra­
nationali ty and Visionary unification. The absence of de 
Gaulle cannot erase the problems of a disunited Germany, the 
problem of control of nUClear weapons, the entry of Britain, 
or the relationship of Europe to the United states and the 
U.S.S.R. 
While the future of European unification then remains 
uncertain, 1 t cannot be said that de Gaulle himself destroyed 
its future.. It is indeed possible that Western Europe will 
yet advance far beyond what has been accomplished to some­
thing completely new in the realm of a regional government 
polity .. 
As someone once 1deely said, de Gaulle may have 
"inSUlted" the future of European integration, but he did 
not single handedly destroy it. 
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